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ABSTRACT 
 This study investigates whether the current lack of structure of internal control weakness 
disclosures (a narrative about the reliability of the financial reporting system) leads 
nonprofessional investors to make differential investment decisions.  Using the non-accelerated 
filer (smaller public company) setting, where nonprofessional investors are likely to consume 
unaudited internal control reports in their investing judgments and decisions, I examine two 
facets of internal control disclosure formats:  presentation salience and disaggregation of material 
weaknesses.  A 2 x 2 between-participants behavioral experiment was conducted with internal 
control presentation salience (bulleted vs. in-text) and disaggregation level (a single material 
weakness vs. a combination of multiple control deficiencies that is a material weakness).  I find 
that nonprofessional investors reward companies that disclose internal control weaknesses more 
saliently.  The results also indicate that disaggregation interacts with salience in that it increases 
the effect of salience on investing judgments such that salient (stealth) disclosure of a 
combination of control deficiencies is viewed more positively (negatively) than salient (stealth) 
disclosure of a material weakness. These findings are contrary to Rennekamp (2012) who finds 
that processing fluency in bad news leads to more negative investment judgements.  Additional 
analyses indicated that the results related to management trust and credibility are consistent with 
prior literature.  The findings contribute to academia and practice by shedding light on the 
importance that needs to be placed on the presentation format of internal control disclosures.   
1 
 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
With the intent of restoring investor confidence, the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002 
required public companies to evaluate and report on their internal control (IC) over financial 
reporting and to have this process verified by independent auditors.  In addition to  requiring 
management’s assessment of internal controls, PCAOB Auditing Standard No. 5 (AS 5) requires 
the auditor to monitor the quality of internal control weakness (ICW) disclosures and to issue 
additional information clarifying the IC weakness when management has not properly discussed 
or represented the IC weakness in the 10-K filing (PCAOB 2007).  However, in 2010, in 
response to complaints from the business community regarding compliance costs, the Dodd-
Frank Act removed the independent audit of internal controls requirement for smaller publicly 
traded companies (non-accelerated filers).  Since smaller firms operate in a setting where 
information asymmetry between investors and management is high, investors likely use complex 
disclosures related to operating risk and financial reporting risk such as IC reports.   
Nonprofessional investors particularly have difficulty extracting information from longer and 
more complex disclosures and suffer from location effects such as prominence and salience of 
diagnostic information (Elliott 2006; Files et al. 2009; Rennekamp 2012; Libby and Emett 2014).  
Nonprofessional investors are also important to study because in 1999, individual investors 
represented 45% of stock ownership and had an increasing trend (Browning et al. 1999; Brink 
2013).  Therefore, it is important to study how the structure and content of internal control 
disclosures affect nonprofessional investors in the setting of non-accelerated filers.    
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The need for a better disclosure structure in IC reports that improves comparability and 
the ease of specific ICW identification has been raised by researchers (Jonas et al. 2005; cf. 
Bedard et al. 2012b).  However, Arnold et al. (2011) find that many nonprofessional investors 
(unlike professional ones) do not access the information within the currently available IC report, 
although such information has been documented to be useful for investing decisions (Rose et al. 
2010; Asare and Wright 2012).  This information access problem may partly arise from the 
obfuscation of a section in the report that identifies the control weaknesses and discusses the 
effect on the financial statements of each control weakness.  Specifically, nonprofessional 
investors may not be able to extract the important diagnostic information out of the relatively 
long and unstructured portion of the management report on internal controls.  I investigate 
whether the ICW information access problem for nonprofessional investors can be improved by 
structuring the presentation format of the IC report such that the diagnostic information 
(identification of the material weakness in internal controls) is more salient/readable.1   I also 
investigate how the structure of the IC report that has a higher processing fluency (perceived 
ease of processing/clarity) of ICW information may affect nonprofessional investors’ judgments 
and decisions.   
Increasing the salience of the IC report diagnostic information (identification of the 
material weakness in internal controls) as examined in this research is consistent with the SEC 
Plain English Handbook, in which the SEC specifically prescribes the use of “…bullets to list 
information whenever possible” and indicates that doing so “makes information easier to absorb 
in one quick glance…” (SEC 1998). Rennekamp (2012), who uses bullets as one of the ways to 
                                                          
1 The part in the disclosure indicating the ICW presence and type of ICWs (diagnostic information) is typically a 
small proportion of the report relative to the rest of the disclosure which is non-diagnostic (such as the definition of 
an ICW, limitations of ICWs, SEC codification, identification of the framework used, etc.) 
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operationalize readability, finds that the readability of textual disclosure information of both 
positive and negative financial performance amplifies nonprofessional investors’ judgments in 
the respective direction.2  What is unclear in the extant literature is whether such findings will 
translate to the complex reporting setting of ICW disclosure, which involves a non-financial 
qualitative supplemental disclosure about internal control risks (subjective in nature).  To add 
further complexity, investors have to infer the magnitudes of the risks of misstatement 
attributable to each disclosed ICW and the overall materiality of the misstatement used by each 
company.   
In addition to salience, another aspect of ICW that is important to study is to study the 
composition of the ICW.  An ICW, as defined in PCAOB AS No. 5, can  be composed of one 
control deficiency (CD) that rises to the level of a material weakness (MW), or a combination of 
control deficiencies (each immaterial) that collectively pose a reasonable possibility of a material 
misstatement of the financial statements.  Hence, a material weakness can be composed of 
multiple deficiencies with any mix of severity level (control deficiency, significant deficiency, or 
a material weakness) as long as the combination results in a risk of material misstatement.  This 
difference in how the ICW is composed, hereafter ICW disaggregation type, makes the 
evaluation of ICWs a relatively complex task for an investor.  Investors may react differently 
when evaluating a material weakness that is disclosed in an aggregate form as opposed to when it 
                                                          
2Rennekamp’s manipulation for readability includes bulleted list along with three other textual features, such as 
clear bolded headings.  In my experiment, I mirror information presentation salience observed in actual managerial 
reporting practices in 10-Ks by using bullets to point out the specific internal control weaknesses. 
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is disaggregated into immaterial control deficiencies that rise to a material weakness when 
considered in aggregate.3   
In this study, I investigate whether investors’ judgments differ for ICW disaggregation 
types that are either aggregated or disaggregated in material weakness disclosures and whether 
the salience of the ICW information disclosed interacts with disaggregation type.  Prior studies 
that investigate the effect of disaggregation deal with the provision of detail that is quantifiable, 
i.e., the subparts are of known proportions.  Moreover, studies in the psychology literature on 
unpacking effects have found conflicting results as to whether the whole is considered more or 
less than a combination of its subparts.  The setting is unique and suitable for research because 
investors’ evaluating ICWs make investing judgments and decisions without the knowledge of 
private information regarding the disclosed weaknesses.  Specifically, investors operate with no 
information on the probability of financial misstatement that is associated with each reported 
deficiency, whether each reported deficiency is assumed to be independent, and how the control 
deficiencies are valued by management.   
The stream of archival research investigating a multitude of research questions and 
outcomes related to reporting MWs relies on the number and type of MWs disclosed by 
companies.   The interest of academic research on the number and type of MWs provides 
additional motivation to study how investors’ reaction is affected by the composition attribute of 
the IC report; that is, ICW disaggregation type in this study (Hammersley et al. 2008; Klamm 
and Watson 2009; Bedard and Graham 2011; Bedard et al. 2012a; Klamm et al. 2012).  Prior 
                                                          
3 Through a preliminary examination of a sample of the internal control reports for one hundred companies (not 
tabulated), I find that all of the aforementioned reporting practices mentioned are prevalent: IC reports with a high 
saliency ICW disclosure format in the form of a bulleted list and a low saliency ICW disclosure format presented 
within a paragraph (in-text), and IC reports with a MW disclosed as one MW (material) and IC reports with a MW 
discussed as a combination of CDs (immaterial). 
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research does not delineate the difference between a material weakness that results from a 
combination of control deficiencies (disaggregated) and one that is disclosed as one material 
weakness (aggregated).  Also, prior studies have not considered the effect of the presentation 
salience of ICW information disclosed by firms.  By documenting that both the aggregation level 
and degree of presentation salience can influence the judgments and decisions of nonprofessional 
investors, this dissertation informs academics of the need to control for such differences in their 
research projects. 
The results of this study inform standard setters as to how internal control weakness 
disclosures could be standardized and to inform managers of how nonprofessional investors 
perceive the alternative structures of ICW disclosures.  Examining the interaction of disclosure 
presentation format and ICW disaggregation type is important because it identifies whether there 
could be unintended effects on nonprofessional investor judgments as a result of varied 
conventions and managerial stylistic preferences in IC reports.  
The specific research questions investigated in this dissertation are:   
1. What is the effect of presentation salience of ICWs on investing judgments (bullets vs. 
within text)? 
2. What is the effect of disaggregation of ICWs (several control deficiencies vs. one 
weakness) on investing judgments? 
A 2 x 2 between-participants behavioral experiment was conducted with internal control 
disclosure level manipulated as aggregated (one MW) and disaggregated (three CDs) and 
internal control disclosure presentation salience manipulated as stealth (in-text) and salient 
(bullets).  The hypotheses in the study are tested using 164 nonprofessional investors who were 
recruited using a professional survey service.  The experiment involved two stages. Participants 
were shown summary financial information of a small public company and asked three investing 
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judgment questions in the first stage. In the second stage, participants were shown an IC report 
and asked to make revisions to their baseline judgments.  
The results of the experiment indicate that salience of diagnostic internal control risk 
information on IC reports is viewed positively by investors.  Specifically, participants in the 
salient ICW disclosure (bulleted) condition favorably revised their assessments of their overall 
impression of the investment as higher, their assessments of the risk of financial misstatement as 
lower, and their investing amount as higher than those in the stealth ICW disclosure (in-text) 
condition.  The results also indicated that ICW disaggregation type interacts with salience, such 
that the effect of salience on the means investing judgments was stronger when the disclosed 
ICW disaggregation type is disaggregated (multiple control deficiencies).  Investors’ revisions 
indicated that they perceive  the investment as having less downside risk when the ICW 
disaggregation type was a combination of multiple control deficiencies and was disclosed 
saliently (in-bullets) relative to when it was disclosed in a stealth format (in-text).  Supplemental 
analyses on investors’ assessments of management credibility and trust confirm the validity of 
the observed results and are consistent with management trust being affected by ICW 
disclosures. 
This study is important because it aims to explain how investors may be affected by the 
relaxed ICW reporting environment resulting from the revised Dodd-Frank Act.  Managers’ use 
of alternative disclosure presentation formats and varying levels of reporting clarity have 
investing judgment consequences related to management trust and credibility that were 
uncovered through this dissertation.  This study contributes to financial accounting literature that 
investigates the effect of presentation formats as well as disclosure disaggregation on investing 
behavior. These findings should be informative to academics who study internal control 
7 
 
weaknesses using archival methods.  Accounting researchers need to control for the presentation 
salience of the disclosed ICW and whether the ICW is composed of one material weakness or a 
combination of control deficiencies that aggregate to one material weakness.  Finally, the study 
contributes to the unpacking effect research stream in psychology literature.  The unpacking 
literature is largely mixed in terms of whether unpacking leads to information cue overweighting 
or underweighting. 
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides a review of the 
background and literature on internal control reporting under SOX, presentation of disclosures, 
and sophistication of investors.  Section 3 presents the theoretical background and hypotheses.  
Section 4 describes the experimental method utilized in the study.  Section 5 provides discussion 
of the results.  Section 6 provides additional analyses of the results.  Section 7 provides the 
conclusion and discussion of future research. 
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2 BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE 
2.1 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Internal Control Reporting 
In the midst of several corporate reporting scandals around the turn of the 21st century, 
the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) was passed by Congress with the intent of restoring investor 
confidence in the reliability of corporate financial reporting.  The legislation aimed to improve 
several corporate governance issues such as: auditor independence, auditor regulation, 
management accountability for corporate fraud, whistleblower mechanisms in organizations, the 
timely and controlled disclosure of corporate information, and most relevant to this proposal, 
internal control over financial reporting (US House of Representatives 2002; Ge and McVay 
2005).  The ongoing implication of SOX is that management has to continuously monitor and 
report quarterly on the effectiveness of internal controls (section 302), to assess and report 
annually to the public on the effectiveness of internal controls over financial reporting (section 
404a), and for accelerated filers (typically corporations with public float greater than $75 
million) to have the auditor attest to management’s annual assessments of the effectiveness of 
internal controls over financial reporting (section 404b) (US House of Representatives 2002).  
For an extensive literature on research related to internal control reporting under the Sarbanes 
Oxley Act see Schneider et al. (2009), Asare et al. (2012), and Coates IV and Srinivasan (2014). 
2.1.1 Consequences of Internal Control Weakness Disclosures  
During the past decade, the mandate for SOX reporting has led to considerable research 
that examines the consequences of the disclosure of internal control reports from both the 
preparers’ and the report users’ perspective (Schneider et al. 2009).  From the report users’ 
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perspective, the legislation was expected to result in greater transparency and better corporate 
governance designed to reduce management misconduct.  Research in this area investigates 
whether report users find value in the disclosure of internal control weaknesses by firms. 
Findings indicate that the stock market reacts negatively to the disclosure of ICWs as proxied by 
negative cumulative abnormal returns and higher cost of equity for disclosing firms 
(Hammersley et al. 2008; Gupta and Nayar 2007; Beneish et al. 2008; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. 
2009).  Firms disclosing ICWs experience credit rating downgrades, higher interest rates for 
bank loans, and higher cost of debt, indicating that the credit market also finds ICW disclosures 
informative (Costello and Wittenberg Moerman 2010; Dhaliwal et al. 2011; Kim et al. 2011; 
Crabtree and Maher 2012).  Consecutive disclosures of ICWs (i.e., failure to remediate existing 
material weaknesses) are also informative to equity and credit markets (Kim et al. 2011; 
Hammersley et al. 2012).  Experimental investigations in this area find that perceptions of 
investing by individual investors, bank loan decisions and analyst assessments of firm risk are 
sensitive to ICW disclosures (Arnold et al. 2011; Rose et al. 2010; Asare and Wright 2012).  
From the preparer’s perspective, despite the documented benefits of SOX in terms of 
improvements in corporate governance and investor confidence, researchers and practitioners 
argue that the compliance costs of the legislation are not warranted (Krishnan et al. 2008a; 
Hochberg et al. 2009; Cohen et al. 2010; Cohen et al. 2012).  Ghosh and Pawlewicz (2009) 
document an average audit fee increase of 74 percent after SOX adoption.  When compared to 
firms without ICWs, firms that report ICWs have higher audit fees that remain high for up to two 
years after the ICW is remediated (Raghunandan and Rama 2006; Foster et al. 2007; Hoag and 
Hollingsworth 2011; Munsif et al. 2011; Keane et al. 2012).  Overall, these compliance costs 
10 
 
have driven some public US companies to go private and some foreign companies to delist from 
US equity markets (Engel et al. 2007; Doidge et al. 2010; Hostak et al. 2013). 
The costliest portion of SOX, section 404(b), requires managements’ assessments of the 
effectiveness of internal controls to be audited by the external auditor (Tackett et al. 2006; 
Krishnan et al. 2008b; Iliev 2010; Ahmed et al. 2010). As a result of continued pressure by the 
business community and lobbying of politicians regarding the heavy burden imposed on smaller 
companies, the original SOX section 404(b) adoption timeframe for smaller companies was 
postponed five times (Shepardson and Kinney 2011; Kinney Jr et al. 2013).  In 2010, the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act permanently exempted smaller public 
companies (non-accelerated filers) from the section 404(b) internal control audit mandate (US 
House of Representatives 2010).  Dodd-Frank was followed by the Jumpstart our Business 
Startups Act (JOBS ACT) in 2012, which further expanded the exemption from section 404(b) to 
new public companies (Emerging Growth Companies, hereafter EGCs) for the first five years of 
their operation (US House of Representatives 2012).4  
2.1.2 Is the Permanent Exemption of Non-accelerated Filers from Section 404(b) 
Warranted? 
“SOX compliance reduced the market value of small firms” (Iliev 2010, 1163). Many 
small firms ended up leaving the public equity market because they did not want to bear the 
direct monetary compliance costs and indirect costs of inefficient allocation of human resources 
(Kamar et al. 2009).  Research indicates that delaying the adoption of section 404(b) resulted in 
significant cost savings for small firms (Zhang 2007).  Due to the compliance cost burden 
                                                          
4 Emerging growth companies, according to the SEC, are new public companies that meet the following criteria:   i) 
not large accelerated filers,  ii) total market value under $1 billion, iii) revenue under $1billion, and  iv) debt issued 
in the past three years does not exceed $1billion. 
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argument, the Dodd-Frank and JOBs Acts have made small firms and EGC firms exempt from 
the internal control attestation 404(b) requirement.  However, such exemption from regulation 
comes with economic consequences.  It provides firms with incentives to stay small, resulting in 
undesirable actions such as “undertaking less investment, making more cash payouts to 
shareholders, reducing the number of shares held by non-affiliates, [and] making more bad news 
disclosures…” (Gao et al. 2009, 459).    
2.1.2.1 Certification of management’s Internal Control reporting 
Researchers have started to investigate whether Dodd-Frank was justified in permanently 
exempting section 404(b) compliance for small firms (R. Mithu Dey and Sullivan 2012; Holder 
et al. 2013).  These studies provide mixed results as to whether the exclusion will reduce 
management transparency regarding corporate governance.  In a natural experiment with small 
US public companies, Kinney and Shepardson (2011) find that the group of companies adopting 
management internal control reporting (404a) had statistically and quantitatively similar rates of 
material weakness disclosure as the group adopting audited internal control reporting (404b), but 
with much lower audit fee increases.  On the other hand, after the permanent exemption of SOX 
404(b), Holder et al. (2013) document a significant deterioration in financial reporting quality 
among non-accelerated filers, measured by earnings management and accrual quality measures.  
In the absence of IC report auditor oversight, management may choose to be less transparent in 
ICW reporting. 
The PCAOB Auditing Standard No. 5 (AS5) requires the auditor to publish a separate 
internal control report to discuss the ICW further if the auditor perceives the description of ICW 
in the management report to be insufficient or misleading to the report users (PCAOB 2007).  In 
the absence of auditor certification of the internal control reporting, management can exercise 
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higher discretion in the level of ICW detail it chooses to discuss/disclose.  I investigate how 
investors respond to the internal control report in the absence of auditor verification, among non-
accelerated filers, and how they respond to manager’s discretionary choices in internal control 
report formatting and ICW disaggregation (packaging) type. 
2.1.2.2 Classification of deficiencies in Internal Control by severity: Material 
Weaknesses and Control Deficiencies 
AS5 classifies deficiencies in internal control over financial reporting into three major 
categories: Material weakness, significant deficiency and control deficiency.  This classification 
is based on the severity of the financial misstatement that may result from the failure of such 
controls.   Material weaknesses, which are the most severe types of control deficiencies, are 
categories of control deficiencies that pose the risk that a financial misstatement that is above the 
organization’s materiality threshold occurred or could be undetected. While material weaknesses 
are required to be disclosed to the public, the other two categories of control deficiencies are 
only reported to the audit committee and remain private, unless they are voluntarily disclosed.  
Listed below, in increasing order of severity, are the AS5 definitions of the severity categories 
for internal control deficiencies as stated in paragraphs A3, A11, and A7. 
L. Control deficiency:  A deficiency in internal control over financial reporting exists when the 
design or operation of a control does not allow management or employees, in the normal 
course of performing their assigned functions, to prevent or detect misstatements on a timely 
basis. (PCAOB 2007, para A3) 
M. Significant deficiency:   A significant deficiency is a deficiency, or a combination of 
deficiencies, in internal control over financial reporting that is less severe than a material 
weakness, yet important enough to merit attention by those responsible for oversight of the 
company's financial reporting. (PCAOB 2007, para A11) 
H. Material weakness:  A material weakness is a deficiency, or a combination of deficiencies, 
in internal control over financial reporting, such that there is a reasonable possibility that a 
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material misstatement of the company's annual or interim financial statements will not be 
prevented or detected on a timely basis. (PCAOB 2007, para A7) 
As noted above, material weaknesses may either be one deficiency that independently 
poses a risk of a material misstatement or a combination of control deficiencies that in aggregate 
pose a risk of material misstatement.  I refer to these material weakness composition differences 
as ICW disaggregation type throughout this study. It is important to delineate the differences 
between control deficiencies and material weaknesses because the literature shows that the 
market reacts differently to these categories of weaknesses as well as the vagueness of the 
descriptions of the weaknesses (Hammersley et al. 2008).  
2.2 Incremental Information vs. Management Obfuscation 
The incremental information paradigm can be used to help explain management 
incentives to disclose ICW information.  The paradigm assumes that managers are interested in 
their reputation and focus on providing value-relevant incremental information.  Under this 
perspective, managers disclose more transparently to reduce information asymmetry and lower 
cost of capital (Merkl-Davies and Brennan 2007).  The incremental information camp assumes a 
semi-strong form of market efficiency, whereas the impression management (management 
obfuscation) camp assumes a weak form of market efficiency or some inefficiency (Merkl-
Davies and Brennan 2007). 
The management obfuscation hypothesis on the other hand can be used to explain 
management incentives to reduce transparency relative to ICWs.  It argues that managers have a 
disincentive to disclose adverse information and attempt to reduce the negative investor response 
that may arise from doing so (Merkl-Davies and Brennan 2007).  This behavioral finance 
perspective assumes that investors have information processing limitations and can be misled. 
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Managers will employ strategies to delay the timely processing of adverse information by 
increasing the information processing cost for such information (Bloomfield’s “incomplete 
revelation hypothesis”) and hiding the information in complex disclosures (Bloomfield 2002; Li 
2008). Readability research finds that managers tend to be self-serving and obfuscate the 
mandatory disclosure information to mitigate the negative investor responses in these unaudited 
disclosures (Libby and Emett 2014; Li 2008; Courtis 1998).   
2.2.1 Documented Lack of Internal Control Reporting Transparency  
Research in internal control reporting indicates that only about a quarter of all material 
weaknesses in internal control are detected by management while the rest are detected by the 
auditor on an annual internal control audit (Bedard and Graham 2011).  Using working papers 
from small public audit firms, Bedard and her co-authors find that managers are more likely to 
under-classify material weaknesses (publicly reportable, higher severity control deficiencies) as 
significant deficiencies and control deficiencies (not publicly reported, lower severity).  Their 
evidence suggests that in the absence of an internal control audit, managers may have more 
control deficiencies and significant deficiencies than material weaknesses and these may 
aggregate to a material weakness.   
The number of IC reports issued in a given year that contain material weaknesses has 
been decreasing over time (Boritz et al. 2012).  This decline in reporting ICWs may be a result of 
management’s improvement in understanding and handling of ICs or management’s reduced 
willingness to disclose ICWs.  There is evidence to support the hypothesis that managers are not 
disclosing some material weaknesses to the public.  Rice and Weber (2012) find that a significant 
proportion of firms that have financial restatements did not report ICWs in prior periods.  Firms 
that report ICWs prior to a restatement are more likely to have class action lawsuits than those 
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that hide ICWs until the restatement occurs, indicating that managers have an incentive to hide 
ICWs and delay their disclosure as long as possible (Coates IV and Srinivasan 2014; Rice et al. 
2013).  
2.3 The structure of the Internal Control Report 
The final SEC ruling on SOX 404 requires companies to include the following in the 
internal control report of management (SEC 2003). 
1. A statement of management's responsibility for establishing and maintaining adequate internal 
control over financial reporting for the company; 
 
2. A statement identifying the framework used by management to conduct the required evaluation of 
the effectiveness of the company's internal control over financial reporting; 
 
3. Management's assessment of the effectiveness of the company's internal control over financial 
reporting as of the end of the company's most recent fiscal year, including a statement as to 
whether or not the company's internal control over financial reporting is effective. The 
assessment must include disclosure of any "material weaknesses" in the company's internal 
control over financial reporting identified by management. Management is not permitted to 
conclude that the company's internal control over financial reporting is effective if there are one 
or more material weaknesses in the company's internal control over financial reporting; and 
 
4. A statement that the registered public accounting firm that audited the financial statements 
included in the annual report has issued an attestation report on management's assessment of the 
registrant's internal control over financial reporting. 
In this study, I classify these required pieces of information into two major parts:  
diagnostic IC information and non-diagnostic IC information.  I categorize item number 3 above 
as diagnostic IC information, because it communicates whether the IC report contains any ICWs.   
I categorize items 1, 2, and 4 above as non-diagnostic information because these contain standard 
language that is common across most reports and provide little informational value, even if the 
report has ICWs.5  The IC report is a narrative that typically ranges from half a page to a page in 
                                                          
5 Item 4 for smaller reporting companies usually indicates that the information has not been audited by the external 
auditor due to being exempt by Dodd-Frank or the JOBS Act. 
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length.  Psychology research indicates that the implications of diagnostic information are 
weakened when it is accompanied by non-diagnostic information; a phenomenon known as the 
“dilution effect” (Nisbett et al. 1981).  Nisbett et al. (1981) find that an increase in non-
diagnostic cues decreases the ability of users to process the diagnostic cue.  It is important to 
note that since the proportion of information disclosed that is diagnostic is much lower than the 
proportion of information that is non-diagnostic, report users may fail to access the diagnostic 
information that makes the IC report useful.   
2.4 Presentation Attributes of Disclosures 
Libby and Emett (2014) outline three presentation attributes of earnings disclosures that 
can affect judgment and decisions of report users: disaggregation, location, and attributes of 
narratives such as location and readability.  The two presentation attributes that are most relevant 
to IC reports are disaggregation and readability. 
2.4.1 Disaggregation 
Disaggregation of information in accounting research has largely focused on quantitative 
items dealing with the financial statement items (Libby and Emett 2014).  Disaggregation 
directly alters disclosed content by increasing the level of private information revealed by 
managers and primarily helps decision-makers extract relevant information from financial 
statements (Libby and Emett 2014).  In this study, disaggregation refers to whether the ICW 
disclosed in the IC report is one material weakness or multiple control deficiencies that are 
individually immaterial, but rise to a material weakness in aggregate. 
2.4.2 Readability  
Accounting research in the area of readability of annual reports has investigated whether 
managers manipulate narrative reports to control report users’ perceptions of firm performance 
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(Merkl-Davies and Brennan 2007).  In the Plain English Handbook, the SEC attempts to protect 
unsophisticated investors by requiring firms to disclose narratives in plain language that is easily 
understandable to the general public (SEC 1998). Nonetheless, the growing literature in this area 
of research indicates that “disclosure readability has only deteriorated over the past decade” 
(Libby and Emett 2014, 427; Li 2008).  
The majority of the readability literature uses linguistic algorithms to perform content 
analysis of annual reports and archival investigations to link readability measures with firm 
performance and investor behavior (Merkl-Davies and Brennan 2007). The readability literature 
suggests that narratives have low readability scores and that other forms of disclosing, such as 
lists and tables may be more readable (Merkl-Davies and Brennan 2007; Adelberg 1979; Parker 
1982).  The literature also finds that firms with good performance have disclosures that are more 
readable while firms with poor performance tend to have disclosures that are less readable (Li 
2008; Courtis 2004). Lower readability of 10-K disclosures has also been linked to market 
under-reactions (You and Zhang 2009). Some of the common readability measures used in the 
literature include: the Fog index6, the Flesch index7, and disclosure length, but each of these 
proxies have received a fair share of criticism (Libby and Emett 2014; Merkl-Davies and 
Brennan 2007; Courtis 1998; Stone and Parker 2013).  
Experimental accounting research in readability attempts to overcome the measurement 
error of readability proxies and to investigate the underlying mechanism by which investors are 
influenced by readability. Rennekamp (2012) manipulates readability by using guidelines from 
                                                          
6 Fog index is a measure of readability that originated in the computational linguistics literature. Fog index uses a 
formula that combines the number of complex words with the number of words per sentence. Li (2008) 
 
7 Flesch index is a measure of readability that is similar to the Fog index but with a slightly different formula that 
uses the words per sentence and syllables per word to calculate readability. Li (2008) 
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the SEC Plain English Handbook and finds that investors respond more positively (negatively) to 
good (bad) news when the readability of the narrative disclosure is higher. Rennekamp (2012) 
finds that processing fluency and subconscious feelings of ease in processing the information 
explain the relation between small investor decisions and readability of earnings release 
disclosures. Tan et al. (2013) also conducted a behavioral experiment and find that investors’ 
performance judgments are more magnified by the readability of earnings release disclosures 
when the information regarding firm’s meeting or beating of prior benchmark performance is 
inconsistent with the firm’s earnings trend.  Tan et al. (2013) find that the relation between 
investing and readability is explained by feelings of processing fluency and increased 
understandability of the disclosure. 
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3 HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
I investigate the effects of presentation format and disaggregation of ICWs in SOX 404 
reports using a framework adapted from Maines and McDaniel (2000) and Hogarth (1987) .  The 
framework, depicted on Figure 1, proposes that the IC presentation format affects the level to 
which users access the ICW section in the IC report, their evaluation of the ICW severity, and 
their weighting of the likelihood of the ICW causing material misstatement.  I propose that these 
assessments influence investors’ perceptions of the riskiness of the investment and investing 
judgments.  As I propose in the framework, the acquisition, evaluation, and weighting of the 
ICW information will depend on the IC presentation format, leading to differences in 
misstatement risk and investing judgments.  In the framework, IC report presentation format 
represents both the level of presentation salience of the ICW information in the IC report and the 
extent to which the ICW section is disaggregated.  The conceptual and operational variables used 
in the proposed study are presented below on Figure 2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Research Model 
  
Investing 
judgments 
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Figure 2. - Predictive Validity Framework (Libby Boxes) 
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3.1 Presentation Salience of ICW Information in IC Reports 
3.1.1 Accessibility of ICW Information in IC Reports 
Nonprofessional investors are more likely to use a sequential search strategy, are more 
likely to get confused and fatigued by long disclosures, and are more likely to struggle to extract 
information from these disclosures than professional investors (Rennekamp 2012; Libby and 
Emett 2014; You and Zhang 2009; Maines and McDaniel 2000; Miller 2010).  Unlike 
professional investors who have well formulated mental models, nonprofessional investors may 
not be able to easily extract the diagnostic ICW information from the IC report.  It is reasonable 
to expect nonprofessional investors to be fatigued by long and unstructured narrative disclosures 
such as IC reports.  In support of this notion, Arnold et al. (2011) document that only 59 percent 
of their nonprofessional participants were able to access the ICW information versus 72 percent 
of their professional investors.   
In addition to fatigue effects that hinder nonprofessional investors’ ability to extract 
information from disclosures, individuals have cognitive limitations and aim to reduce effort 
associated with judgments and decisions by using selective (heuristic) search (Tversky and 
Kahneman 1974; Simon 1990; Shah and Oppenheimer 2008).  They use information in its 
current form to avoid information processing costs even when reconfiguration of this information 
is needed to make better judgments (Payne 1982; Clor‐Proell et al. 2014).  Presentation attributes 
such as disclosure prominence have been shown to moderate the accessibility of information in 
press releases (Files et al. 2009). Clor-Proell et al. (2014) find that presentation salience helps 
nonprofessional investors incorporate otherwise costly information into their judgments.  Bowen 
et al. (2005) also show that the emphasis placed on pro-forma earnings in quarterly press releases 
leads to stronger market reactions.  
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3.1.2 Processing Fluency of ICW Information in IC Reports 
Processing fluency or the subjective ease with which information can be processed can 
affect how people weight information cues (Shah and Oppenheimer 2007).  When information is 
perceived as easy to process, people assign it more weight than when it is perceived as hard to 
process (Shah and Oppenheimer 2007).  Processing fluency has been manipulated in several 
ways in the literature ( see  Alter and Oppenheimer 2009).  Rennekamp (2012) manipulates 
processing fluency using the SEC’s Plain English Handbook as a guide to design her 
experimental materials using features such as clear headings, appropriate layout, tables, and 
bullet points.  Therefore, ICW disclosures with higher salience are expected to have higher processing 
fluency. 
The literature is unclear on whether processing fluency has a non-directional amplifying 
influence or positive influence on the information set disclosed.  That is, investors reading an IC 
report that includes a salient presentation format of ICWs (displayed in bullets) may either view 
the company as a riskier investment, resulting in lower perceptions of investing likelihood than 
investors reading an IC report that has a stealth presentation format of ICWs (displayed within 
the text), or they may view the salient report as more transparent and view the company as a less 
risky investment, resulting in higher perceptions of investing likelihood than investors reading a 
stealth report.   
Two relatively recent studies in the accounting domain have linked processing fluency 
with the effect of readability of earnings disclosures on investing decisions of nonprofessional 
investors (Rennekamp 2012; Tan et al. 2013).  Tan et al. (2013) find that readability increases 
investors’ understanding of a firms’ positive and negative performance, which leads to changes 
in their investing judgments, particularly when firm performance is not easily determinable. 
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Rennekamp (2012) finds that processing fluency of a disclosure increases investors’ reliance on 
such disclosure However,  in the psychology domain, Shah and Oppenheimer (2007) 
demonstrated that nonprofessional investors were less likely to recommend investments that 
were associated with names of brokerage firms that were disfluent than investments that were 
associated with brokerage firms that had fluent names.  Their result indicates that perceived ease 
of processing may positively influence judgments independent of its content and valence. 
On the one hand, usage of bullets to identify the ICWs enhances readability and the ease 
with which the diagnostic ICW information can be extracted and accessed for information 
processing.  This enhanced access to the diagnostic ICW information will initiate the decision 
process so that the user can evaluate the ICW information cue and assign weights to those cues.  
The adapted Maines and McDaniel (2000) ICW presentation format framework, would predict 
that high salience leads to high ICW information access, ICW information evaluation (bad 
news), and high ICW information weighting.  This follows that investors may perceive that the 
information they were able to extract was important enough to be disclosed and that management 
may have a severe internal control issue.  Rennekamp (2012) documents increased weighting of 
the information cue regardless of whether the news was good or bad.  Rennekamp’s findings 
support the idea that is predominant in the readability literature that implies that managers’ 
obfuscation of disclosures to mitigate negative investor responses is warranted since investors 
overreact to negative news when it is more readable.     
On the other hand, increased information access and processing fluency that results from 
disclosing saliently by using bullets to identify ICWs (seemingly bad news) can lead 
management to be perceived as more transparent and credible.  Rennekamp (2012) documents a 
positive relation between processing fluency and management credibility (a variable formed by 
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combining assessments of management trust and competence).  Rose et al. (2010) indicate that 
management trust is an important variable for nonprofessional investor judgments when 
analyzing companies with internal control weakness disclosures.  This indicates the ICW 
disclosure setting may be a setting that management may wish to disclose transparently to 
maintain its reputation and lower cost of capital.  Rose et al. (2010) find that management trust 
was related to lower risk of investing.  When presentation salience of ICW information is high, 
investors are likely to attribute higher presentation salience to higher perceptions of 
management’s credibility, which in turn is expected to positively affect their investing judgments 
and evaluations of misstatement risk.  Accordingly, increased processing fluency in disclosing 
ICW information can signal to investors that management has a good handle on the internal 
controls, rather than when management is disclosing ICWs in a less salient manner.  Therefore, 
the negative investor reaction to higher processing fluency of earnings information in the “bad 
news” setting of Rennekamp (2012) is not expected to translate to the ICW setting where 
presentation salience can be attributed to positive management characteristics and IC 
competence.  Therefore, I formally state my hypotheses as follows: 
H1.   Higher presentation salience of internal control weaknesses will 
mitigate the high perceived risk of misstatement that results from 
the disclosure of internal control weaknesses. 
H2.   Higher presentation salience of internal control weaknesses in an 
internal control report will lead to more favorable investing 
judgements. 
3.2 Disaggregation of ICW Information in IC Reports (Unpacking) 
Accounting research has studied the effect of disaggregation of quantitative financial 
information in several contexts and determined that disaggregation leads to the provision of 
additional information that users find beneficial (Libby and Emett 2014).  Disaggregation of 
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qualitative information, which has been extensively investigated in the psychology literature, can 
also lead to unpacking effects that increase information weighting (Shah and Oppenheimer 
2011).  Unpacking effects of this form occur when people assign higher probability to an event 
when the event is broken down into its sub parts (Tversky and Koehler 1994).  Tversky and 
Koehler’s support theory explains that providing details of an event leads people to more easily 
support their hypothesis that there is a higher likelihood and frequency with which that event 
occurs (Van Boven and Epley 2003). 
Unpacking effects that increase information weighting can also be explained by the 
numerosity heuristic (Pelham et al. 1994).  Numerosity is a heuristic cue that people use when 
evaluating multiple items.  The use of the numerosity heuristic misleads people to judge weights 
of items based on how many items are available (Pelham et al. 1994).  Disaggregated 
components of ICWs may be over-weighted by investors if their numerosity heuristic leads them 
to simply count the number of items listed in the ICW section.   
Contrary to the majority of the findings in the psychology literature on unpacking effects, 
recent work on unpacking effects finds that unpacking does not always lead to a higher 
assignment of weights to cues that are presented in disaggregated formats (Redden and Frederick 
2011).  This may also be the case with ICW disclosures because unpacking leads to multiple 
control deficiencies that are of lower severity than material weaknesses.  Investors may either 
ignore that the deficiencies are material in aggregate or underweight each deficiency.  In support 
of this notion, Redden and Frederick (2011) perform multiple psychology experiments and find 
that greater detail (unpacking) reduces perceived probabilities assigned to events.  Redden and 
Frederick (2011) provide the theoretical explanation for their findings by indicating that 
disaggregation decreases processing fluency.  Their explanation suggests due to processing 
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fluency that is affected by both salience and disaggregation, the factors may have interactive 
effects. 
Rose et al. (2010) find that investors viewed explanation detail, another form of 
transparency, as more useful and assigned more trust to management when the type of ICW was 
one that was pervasive and needed further explanation.  Due to the numerosity heuristic and 
predictions of support theory, investors viewing multiple control deficiencies are likely  to 
overweight the control weakness and view it as relatively severe and worthy of being disclosed 
transparently.  As such, when the type of weakness disclosed is composed of multiple control 
deficiencies, investors should penalize management when it discloses the weakness in a stealth 
manner and reward management when it discloses the weakness saliently.  This effect is not 
expected to occur in the case of one material weakness since the overweighting does not occur 
through numeracy or support theory’s predictions. 
Based on the predominant findings in the psychology literature on unpacking that finds 
that unpacking increases information weighting, support theory, numerosity heuristic, and the 
findings of (Rose et al. 2010), I formally hypothesize the interaction between salience and 
disaggregation resulting from the unpacking effect of disaggregation of ICWs as follows: 
H3.   The negative relation between salience and the risk of 
misstatement is greater when a material weakness is 
disaggregated as a combination of control deficiencies than when 
it is aggregated as a single material weakness.  
H4.   The positive relation between salience and investing judgments is 
greater when a material weakness is disaggregated as a 
combination of control deficiencies than when it is aggregated a 
single material weakness.       
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4 METHOD 
4.1 Experimental Design 
A 2 x 2 between-participants fully randomized factorial experiment was conducted using 
nonprofessional investors recruited by a professional survey service.  The factors manipulated 
are ICW disaggregation type (disaggregated – combination of control deficiencies / aggregated – 
one material weakness) and ICW presentation salience (salient – presented in a bulleted form / 
stealth – presented in-text). The experimental design is presented in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1.  Research Design 
2 x 2  Between-participants experiment 
utilizing nonprofessional investors 
ICW  presentation salience 
Low / Stealth 
(in-text) 
High /Salient 
(bullets) 
ICW 
disaggregation 
type  
 
Aggregated (Packed) –  
One MW 
 
(1) (2) 
Disaggregated 
(Unpacked) – One MW 
that is a combination of 
control deficiencies 
(3) (4) 
 
4.2 Independent Variables  
The independent variables are ICW disaggregation type, ICW presentation salience, and 
investor type.  ICW disaggregation type is manipulated as disaggregated control deficiencies and 
aggregated material weakness.  I operationalize disaggregation by including several control 
deficiencies that are equivalent to one material weakness on the IC report.  I operationalize 
aggregation by including one material weakness in the IC report.  ICW disclosure presentation 
salience is manipulated by displaying the ICW in a salient format or in a less salient “stealth” 
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format.  I operationalize the salient manipulation by displaying the ICW in a bulleted format and 
the stealth manipulation by displaying the ICW in a narrative in-text format.8   
4.3 Dependent Variables 
The dependent variables are perceptions of likelihood of stock price decrease/increase, 
impression of investment, invested amount, and risk of misstatement.  Likelihood of stock price 
decrease/increase is measured on a 15 point scale (-7 High likelihood of decline, 0 No change, 
+7 High likelihood of increase) by asking participants the following risk measure adapted from 
Rose et al. (2010): “what is your assessment of the likelihood of a moderate stock price change 
(1-10%) within the next year?”  Overall impression of investment is a question taken from 
(Kaplan et al. 2015) and is measured on a seven point Likert scale (1-Very unfavorable, 7-Very 
favorable).  The Overall impression of investment question asked of participants is:  “What is 
your overall impression of ANZ Technologies as an investment?”  The invested amount 
dependent variable is adopted from (Farkas and Murthy 2014) and is measured by asking 
participants to assume they had inherited $10,000 from a distant relative and that they wanted to 
spend their inheritance on stocks.  Participants are then asked to specify an amount between $0 
and $10,000 that they would like to invest in the company’s stock.  Risk of misstatement was 
collected using a question adapted from (Asare and Wright 2012): “What is the risk that ANZ's 
financial statements contain a material misstatement?”  (0- No chance of a material 
misstatement, 10-Highly likely a material misstatement). 
                                                          
8Rennekamp’s manipulation for readability included bulleted list along with three other textual features, such as 
clear bolded headings.  In my experiment, I mirror information presentation salience observed in actual managerial 
reporting practices by using bullets to point out the specific internal control weaknesses. 
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4.4 Covariates 
Several potential covariates are measured in a post experimental questionnaire.  Since 
risk assessments are likely to be correlated with inherent risk preferences, individual propensity 
to take risk is measured using three risk preference questions from Van Rooij et al. (2011). Rank 
of risk is assessed by the number of times the person goes with a risky option (0-Risk averse, 3- 
Risk seeking).  See Table 4.2 for further detail on the risk preference questions. Education is a 
seven scale ordinal variable that is measured by asking participants’ level of education (1-No 
schooling, 2-High school degree, 3-Some college credits, less than two years of full time course 
work, 4-Associate degree, or over two years of full time course work, 5-Bachelor’s degree, 6-
Master’s degree, 7-Doctorate degree).  Participants are also asked whether they had a degree in 
the area of Business Administration and how many accounting and finance courses they have 
taken.  Investing horizon is another variable that is collected to determine whether participants 
are interested in a long term profit or a short term gain from the investing activity.  Investing 
horizon is measured using a nine point Likert scale (1-short horizon, 9-long horizon).   
In their review of literature on presentation formats, Libby and Emett (2014) indicate that 
financial literacy and investing experience may work to mitigate the effects of poor readability 
on investing.  I control for financial literacy by asking 11 questions from an advanced financial 
literacy scale that was developed by Van Rooij et al. (2011).  Another potential covariate for 
nonprofessional investors is reliance on financial advisors.  Familiarity of 10-k reports, self-
assessed familiarity, and reliance on internal controls is also collected.  Following Rose et al. 
(2010), an understanding check question on internal controls is also measured in the post 
experimental questionnaire to ensure that a majority of participants understand the company risks 
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that are related to an incidence of internal control weakness disclosures.  The variables used in 
the study are listed in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2.  Variable Definitions 
 
Panel A.  Dependent and independent variables 
I. Main dependent variables 
1)  Risk of 
misstatement  
 Risk that financial statements contain a material misstatement (0- 
No chance of a material misstatement, 10- Highly likely a material 
misstatement) 
2)  Revised impression 
of investment  
 Revised impression of company as an investment (1-Very 
unfavorable, 7-Very favorable) 
3)  Revised likelihood 
of stock price 
decrease/increase  
 Revised Likelihood of moderate stock price change (1-10%) 
within one year  (-7 High likelihood of decline, 0 No change, +7 
High likelihood of price increase), recoded to a 15 point scale for 
analyses (1-15)   
4) Revised invested 
amount  
 Revised investment amount on company stock to be allocated 
from a $10,000 inheritance, free response (0-$10,000) 
  
 II.  Baseline for dependent variables (to be included as covariates) 
1)  Baseline impression 
of investment  
 Baseline impression of company as an investment (1-Very 
unfavorable, 7-Very favorable) 
2)  Baseline likelihood 
of price 
decline/increase  
 Baseline likelihood of moderate stock price change (1-10%) 
within one year  (-7 High likelihood of decline, 0 No change, +7 
High likelihood of increase), recoded to a 15 point scale for analyses 
(1-15)   
3)  Baseline invested 
amount  
 Baseline investment amount on company stock to be allocated 
from a $10,000 inheritance, free response (0-$10,000) 
  
III.  Independent variables 
1)  Presentation 
Salience  
 Presentation salience manipulation (0- Stealth/In-text narrative, 1- 
Salient/Bulleted list) 
2)  ICW disaggregation 
type 
 Disaggregation manipulation (0- Disaggregated/Multiple CDs, 1- 
Aggregated/MW) 
  
Panel B.  Demographic and post-experimental questionnaire variables 
III.  Independent variables 
1)  Risk preference 
Rank of risk assessed by the number of times the person goes with 
a risky option (0-Risk averse, 3- Risk seeking).  I use a risk scale 
that has three questions developed by Van Rooij et al. (2011).  A 
display logic was used to show either RQ2 or RQ3 based on 
participants’ responses RQ1.  If the participant selected “yes” 
(risky option) for RQ1, RQ2 is displayed, otherwise if “no” or “I 
don’t know” are selected to indicate a safe choice, RQ3 is 
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displayed.  Therefore, each participant was exposed to only two 
risk questions. 
“RQ1. Suppose that you are the only income earner in the family, 
and you have a good job guaranteed to give you (your family) 
your current income every year for life. You are given the 
opportunity to take a new, equally good job, with 50% chance it 
will double your (family) income and a 50% chance that it will cut 
your (family) income by a third. Would you take the new job? 
(Yes/No/I don’t know) (Van Rooij et al. 2011, 470)” 
“RQ2. Suppose the chances were 50% that it would double your 
(family) income, and 50% that it would cut it in half.  Would you 
take the new job? (Yes/No/I don’t know) (Van Rooij et al. 2011, 
471)” 
“RQ3.  Suppose the chances were 50% that it would double your 
(family) income and 50% that it would cut it by 20 percent.  
Would you then take the new job? (Yes/No/I don’t know) (Van 
Rooij et al. 2011, 471) 
2) Financial literacy
Correct number of responses on 11 “advanced” financial literacy 
scale questions adopted from Van Rooij et al. (2011).  Please see 
their paper to see a complete list of their “advanced” financial 
literacy questions. 
3) Self-assessed IC
understanding
Self-reported understanding of internal controls (1-Low level of 
understanding, 7-High level of understanding) 
4) ICFR influences my
investing decision
The extent to which IC disclosures affect the participants’ 
investing decisions (1-No, Internal control disclosures do not 
affect my investing decisions, 7-Yes, Internal control disclosures 
affect my investing decisions) 
5) Familiarity with
10K reports
Familiarity with annual (10-K) report of public companies (1- Not 
familiar, 7- Very familiar) 
6) Investment horizon Investment horizon (1-Short term investment horizon, 9-Long term investment horizon) 
7) Investing experience The number of years it has been since the participant began buying or selling individual stocks on his/her own (text entry) 
8) Reliance on
financial advisor
Reliance on financial advisor/broker/planner for investments ( 1- I 
manage all my investments on my own, 7-I let my financial 
advisor/planner handle all my investments) 
9) Investor inactive The number of months that have passed since the participant last actively bought or sold stocks in the stock market (text entry) 
10) Trading frequency
 Number of trades per year (1- Less than 10 trades per year, 2- 10 
to 100 trades per year, 3- 100 to 1000 trades per year, 4- Over 
1,000 trades per year) 
11) Work experience  Number of years of professional work experience (text entry) 
12) Education rank  Highest level of education (1-No schooling, 2-High school degree, 3-Some college credits, less than two years of full time 
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course work, 4-Associate degree, or over two years of full time 
course work, 5-Bachelor’s degree, 6-Master’s degree, 7-Doctorate 
degree) 
13) Business degree  Business degree (1-Yes, 0-No) 
14) Accounting courses   Number of accounting courses taken (text entry)
15) Finance courses  Number of finance courses taken (text entry) 
16) Severity of overall
ICW reported
Severity of the overall combination of CDs/single MW reported in 
the IC report (1-Very low severity, 7-Very high severity) 
17) Likelihood of
material error of
overall ICW
reported
 Likelihood of the overall combination of CDs/single MW to cause 
material errors (0% - No chance, 100% - Certain to cause material 
errors) 
18) Severity of ICDs
Mean of the severity assessments on the three IC deficiencies 
presented in the disaggregated conditions (1-Very low severity, 7-
Very high severity)  
19) Likelihood of
material error of
ICDs
Mean of assessments of likelihood of internal control deficiency to 
cause material errors on the three IC deficiencies presented in the 
disaggregated conditions (0% - No chance, 100% - Certain to 
cause material errors)  
20) Processing fluency
Response to the question ”The specific section discussing the 
internal control issue(s) disclosed was clearly presented/easy to 
understand” (1-Strongly disagree, 7- Strongly agree) 
21) Reliability of IC
report
 The extent that participants thought they could rely on the internal 
control report (1- Not at all, 7- Completely)  
22) Management
competence
 Assessment of management competence in preparing and 
communicating company disclosures to the public (1-Strongly 
disagree, 7- Strongly agree). 
23) Management
trustworthiness
 Assessment of management trustworthiness in preparing and 
communicating company disclosures to the public (1-Strongly 
disagree, 7- Strongly agree) 
24) CD vs MW severity
knowledge
 1-CDs are much more severe than MWs, 4-CDs and MWs are of 
equal severity, 7- MWs are much more severe than CDs 
25) MD&A reading
frequency
The frequency with which the participant reads the Management 
Discussion and Analysis section of a company's annual report (1- 
Never read, 2-Sometimes read, 3-Often read, 4-Always read) 
26) Auditor’s Report
reading frequency
The frequency with which the participant reads the Auditor’s 
Report section of a company's annual report (1- Never read, 2-
Sometimes read, 3-Often read, 4-Always read) 
27) Notes reading
frequency
The frequency with which the participant reads the Notes to the 
Financial Statements section of a company's annual report (1- 
Never read, 2-Sometimes read, 3-Often read, 4-Always read) 
28) IC understanding
check
 How does the presence of internal control weaknesses affect a 
company's financial reporting system? (1- Negative effect,  7-
Positive effect) 
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29) IC report
effectiveness check
Did management indicate that the internal control over financial 
reporting was not effective? (1- Yes, the company’s internal 
control was not effective, 2-No, the company’s internal control 
was effective, 3-I do not know) 
4.5 Participants 
Participants used to test the hypotheses were 164 U.S. nonprofessional investors recruited 
through a professional survey service.   The target sample size of 160 nonprofessional investors 
was determined after performing an ex-ante power analyses to calculate the sample size for the 2 
x 2 design based on expected means and standard deviation for the expected effect size.9  To 
confirm that participants recruited were indeed nonprofessional investors they were prescreened. 
To be included in the experiment participants answered “yes” to the question: “Have you bought 
or sold individual stocks in the past two years?” and answered “no” to the question:  “Have you 
bought or sold individual stocks as part of your profession (e.g. broker, analyst, etc.)?”10  
Nonprofessional investors were compensated an undisclosed incentive by the survey collection 
company for their participation.11        
4.6 Tasks and Procedures 
Participants recruited using the professional survey service were directed to the online 
experimental instrument.  The experimental task began with participants reading background 
information including a brief explanation of material weaknesses, a description of how the ICW 
disaggregation type can differ, a description of the industry condition, and a brief description of 
9 Rennekamp (2012) used 234 Amazon Mechanical Turk participants in a 2x2 design and reported similar standard 
deviation as used in my power analyses. 
10 The third screening criterion was whether the participant was using a personal computer.  This criterion was 
necessary because the survey would not display properly on mobile devices. 
11 The professional survey service was paid $8 per participant. 
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the company (ANZ Technologies).  Participants were then provided with financial statements 
supplemented with key company and industry ratios after which they were asked to provide their 
baseline assessments of their overall impression of ANZ as an investment (1-Unfavorable, 7-
Favorable), the extent to which they would invest their inheritance of $10,000 in ANZ, and the 
likelihood of stock price decrease/increase (-7 High likelihood of a decline, +7 High likelihood 
of an increase).  Afterwards, participants were presented with an IC report that contained the 
experimental manipulations followed by an opportunity to revise their baseline responses to the 
same impression, investment decision and investment risk questions as well as a fourth (new) 
question that prompted participants to provide their perceived risk of misstatement.  The 
dependent variables for the study were the revised (later) assessments from the second stage and 
the risk of misstatement assessment.  
Following the collection of the primary dependent variables, participants were asked 
manipulation check questions and a processing fluency question.  Participants were then 
exclusively shown the specific ICW disclosed and asked to indicate their overall assessments of 
severity and likelihood of a future material error for all experimental conditions.  For the control 
deficiency (disaggregate) conditions, once participants assessed the overall severity and 
likelihood of future material error, they were asked to indicate the severity and likelihood 
assessments for each control deficiency; recall that participants were also asked to indicate the 
combined severity and likelihood of future material error related to the combination of the CDs.  
The collection of both the combined and individual measures was performed to enable analyses 
of whether the sum of the parts is considered less or more than the whole (combination of CDs 
vs. MWs).  Participants completed questions related to their perceptions of management, the 
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internal control report, risk preferences, and their financial literacy.  The experiment concluded 
with participants responding to several post-experimental questions and demographics questions. 
4.7 Statistical Analyses 
4.7.1 Manipulation Checks  
Two manipulation check questions were asked to determine whether the manipulations 
are effective.  The first manipulation check question (MCQ) asked participants the following: 
“What was (were) the type of internal control issue(s) indicated in management's report on 
internal control over financial reporting?” with the options: (i.) Three control deficiencies that 
are not material individually, but in aggregate, their combination could result in a material 
misstatement, (ii.) One material weakness that could result in a material misstatement.   
 
Figure 3. Manipulation Check Questions 
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The second MCQ asked participants the following: “How was the part of the disclosure 
discussing the internal control issue(s) formatted/presented?”  The participants were asked to 
select one of two images of page patterns as depicted in Figure 3: one that appeared to have 
bulleted lists between two paragraphs, and another that had three paragraphs with no bullets.   
4.7.2 Hypotheses Testing  
Hypothesis 1 posits that there will be a main effect of presentation salience of ICWs 
disclosed in IC reports on the perceived risk of misstatement.  Hypothesis 2 predicts that there 
will be a main effect of presentation salience of ICWs disclosed in IC reports on investing 
judgments.  Hypothesis testing for H1 and H2 is performed using a MANCOVA model followed 
by ANCOVA analyses on the misstatement risk variable and the likelihood of investing 
variables.   
Hypothesis 1 is tested using the following ANCOVA model to examine the coefficient on 
the Salience variable.  The means of risk of misstatement are also compared between the salient 
and stealth groups to validate the direction of the significance.  
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑀𝑀+ 𝛽𝛽3𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀 ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑀𝑀 + 𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅  
Hypothesis 2 is also tested by examining the coefficient on the Salience variable in the 
model below.  The means of each investing judgment variable are also compared between the 
salient and stealth conditions to validate the direction of the significance.  
𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷 𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑀𝑀+ 𝛽𝛽3𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀 ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑀𝑀 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷 𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 +  𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑜𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 
37 
 
Hypotheses 3 and 4 suggest that the effects of presentation salience and disaggregation 
on assessments of misstatement risk and investing decisions will be interactive, such that 
disaggregation will be viewed more favorable when it coincides with salient disclosure and more 
unfavorable when it coincides with stealth disclosure of ICWs.  A MANCOVA model followed 
by separate ANCOVA models is used to test these hypotheses.  This is followed up with post-
hoc comparison of means to determine if the effect of disaggregation and salience are interactive 
in the disaggregated conditions. 
Hypothesis 3 is tested by examining the coefficient on the interaction between Salience 
and Disaggregation as shown in the risk of misstatement model that is used to test Hypothesis 1.  
A post-hoc comparison of means in the two disaggregated conditions will also be performed.   
Hypothesis 4 is tested by examining the coefficient on the interaction between Salience and 
Disaggregation as shown in the revised investing judgments model that is used to test Hypothesis 
2.  A post-hoc comparison of means of revised investing judgments in the two disaggregated 
conditions is also performed.   
4.8 Pilot Experiment 
A pilot experiment was conducted using 115 U.S. nonprofessional investors on M-Turk. 
The participants took an average of 18.3 minutes to complete the study.  Participants had an 
average age of 56.32 years and average investing experience of 18.77 years.12  They had an 
average work experience of 25.31 years and had completed an average of 2.38 accounting 
courses and 1.97 finance courses.  The descriptive statistics of the study are included in Table 
4.3.  
                                                          
12 The relatively higher average age of participants likely resulted from screening out participants who were using 
mobile devices to complete the survey.   The pre-screening criteria of only allowing participants using personal 
computers was necessary because the online survey would not display correctly on mobile devices.  
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Table 4.3. Descriptive Statistics for the Pilot Study   
 Disaggregated 
/ Salient 
Means (s.d. or 
percent) 
Disaggregated 
/ Stealth 
Means (s.d. or 
percent) 
Aggregated 
/ Salient 
Means (s.d. 
or percent) 
Aggregated 
/ Stealth 
Means (s.d. 
or percent) 
Restatement 
/ Control 
Means (s.d. 
or percent) 
Overall 
Sample 
Means (s.d. 
or percent) 
 n = 23 n = 22 n = 21 n = 25 n = 24 n = 115 
Investor horizon 6.09 6.68 6.38 5.44 6.83 6.27 
 (1.41) (2.03) (2.06) (2.69) (1.99) (2.12) 
Reliance on 
financial advisor 
2.87 2.00 2.38 2.48 3.00 2.56 
(1.71) (1.54) (1.63) (1.78) (2.38) (1.85) 
Investing 
experience (years) 
3.83 6.36 8.90 8.56 5.46 6.61 
(4.49) (4.77) (7.27) (6.76) (5.48) (6.06) 
Gender            
Male 20 (87%) 15 (68%) 20 (95%) 17 (68%) 20 (83%) 92 (80%) 
Female 3 (13%) 7 (32%) 1 (5%) 8 (32%) 4 (17%) 23 (20%) 
Age 27.35 29.36 34.76 34.80 30.83 31.43 
 (9.15) (6.17) (13.51) (10.61) (9.43) (10.28) 
College credits 99.87 155.73 89.52 110.88 124.17 116.13 
 (51.77) (194.94) (70.42) (64.00) (46.83) (100.99) 
Business degree 8.00 7.00 4.00 6.00 6.00 31.00 
  (35%)  (32%) (19%)   (24%)  (25%) (27%) 
Accounting 
courses 
2.65 3.05 2.67 1.16 2.33 2.34 
(3.72) (3.95) (4.78) (1.43) (3.00) (3.50) 
Business courses 4.35 6.32 3.05 4.56 5.17 4.70 
 (5.51) (8.62) (3.85) (6.36) (6.06) (6.26) 
Duration 
(minutes) 
14.22 13.68 14.86 12.72 9.04 12.83 
(12.00) (6.27 (6.69) (5.20) (7.90) (8.09) 
Risk of stock price 
decline 
4.48 5.36 5.24 5.28 4.92  
(1.59) (1.47) (1.67) (1.93) (1.53)  
Likelihood of  50.87 46.36 50.95 41.20 49.17  
investing (20.65) (19.89) (20.47) (5.20) (18.86)  
Investor horizon (short term investing horizon – 1 , long term investing horizon – 9)   
Reliance on financial advisor (1-I manage all my investments on my own ,  7-I let my financial advisor/planner manage my 
investments) 
Risk of stock price decline – the risk of a moderate (1-10%) stock price decline in the next year (1-very low, 9- very high) 
Likelihood of investing - likelihood of investing on an 11 point scale (No chance = 0 , Certain to invest = 100)      
 
Thirty-five out of 115 participants failed all manipulation check questions and only 18 
participants were able to answer all the manipulation check questions correctly.  One explanation 
for such a high manipulation failure rate in the pilot study is that participants were presented with 
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a remediation report immediately before the questions were asked.13  Therefore, participants may 
have focused on the remediation information when responding to the questions.   
The results from the pilot study can be summarized as follows.  There is a marginally 
significant main effect of salience on the likelihood of investing but not on the assessments of 
investment risk.  Investors were less likely to invest when the ICW disclosure salience was low 
(in-text) than when it was high (bullets), providing preliminary support for H2.  There was a 
main effect of disaggregation on investment risk and likelihood of investing such that 
disaggregation lead to underweighting of ICWs.  There was also a significant interaction 
between financial literacy and salience and disaggregation. This suggests that additional 
investigation of financial literacy and inclusion of the variable as a covariate is warranted in the 
study. 
4.8.1 Lessons Learned from the Pilot Study 
The pilot study helped identify several problems with the instrument that has since been 
updated in the dissertation.   
1. The pilot instrument included analyst forecasts information and presented the case 
as a restatement setting.  The analyst forecast information was removed in the 
dissertation to reduce noise in the measured dependent variables.  The restatement 
setting was also removed in the dissertation to avoid problems of operational 
validity.   
2. High manipulation check failures are likely to have been caused by poor 
placement and wording in the MCQs.  The questions were improved to address 
the ambiguity and were placed immediately after the manipulation in the current 
version of the instrument.   
3. It was not clear whether participants were responding to the financial performance 
or the disclosure of the ICWs.  This was addressed by changing the instrument to 
a pre-post design, where participants’ assessments of the company’s financials are 
                                                          
13 The remediation of ICWs disclosure that was presented after the manipulations was included in the pilot for 
exploratory purposes and is not included in the dissertation. 
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captured in the first stage and their assessments to ICWs are captured in the 
second stage.  
4.  The restatement setting may have impacted the results such that participants were 
negatively primed.  In a restatement setting, investors are likely to consider ICWs 
as an explanation for the restatement, and thus should penalize the company less 
when they are aware of the presence of ICWs.  Therefore the pilot results are 
consistent with the idea that salient ICWs would lead to positive responses and 
result in investors being more likely to invest.  Removing the restatement setting 
is expected to change the pilot results to the predicted direction. 
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5 RESULTS 
5.1 Manipulation Checks, Attention Checks, and Final Sample Size 
5.1.1 Attention Checks 
Attention checks were implemented with the help of the panel service to identify those 
that were speeding through the experiment and not attending to the task.  The question “please 
select ‘6’ for this question” was included in the post-experimental questionnaire to help identify 
participants who were not attending to the task.  Thirty-eight participants were identified as 
failing this attention check and were removed by the survey company.  Eleven participants were 
identified as speeders and were also excluded by the survey company.  After exclusion of the 
speeders and attention check failures, the data collection service provided 361 observations.   
5.1.2 Manipulation Checks and Final Sample Size 
Out of 361 observations, 109 participants failed the manipulation check question 
regarding the type of internal control issue (CDs or MWs) and 146 participants failed the 
manipulation check question regarding the type of presentation format that was used (bullets or 
in-text).14   Despite the relatively high manipulation failures, I was able to collect enough 
observations to run my statistical analyses using data of participants who passed both the 
manipulation check questions.  The final sample size used in all hypotheses included 164 
observations of participants who passed all manipulations check questions.   
                                                          
14 One explanation for the high rate of failure in the manipulation check questions is that the survey company 
advertised the experiment as a “short 9 minute survey”.  However, the mean duration of the study as indicated in the 
descriptive statistics is around 18 minutes.  
42 
 
Eighty-one of the 361 observations provided by the panel service had incomplete data 
due to the survey company choosing to terminate the sessions for participants who failed the 
specified manipulation check questions.15  Therefore, sensitivity tests that included the 
manipulation failures and required use of covariates were limited to 280 observations.  Table 5.1 
compares the descriptive statistics for participants who failed the manipulation check questions 
with those who passed.  Participants who failed the manipulation check questions on average 
were less educated (p=.056) and had taken a lower number of finance courses (p<.072).  Lower 
means of financial literacy was also associated with participants who failed manipulation check 
questions (p=.002).  On the other hand, participants who passed the manipulation check were 
more familiar with 10K reports (p=.04) and on average read MD&A and Auditor’s reports more 
frequently (based on 1-tailed tests driven by directional expectations, p<.10).  There was also a 
significant difference in IC knowledge between the participants who failed the manipulation 
check questions and those who passed.  Those who failed the manipulation on average indicated 
lower understanding of IC (p=.099) and thought they were less influenced by IC reports 
(p=.006).  
As expected, baseline investing judgment responses were not significantly different 
between participants who passed and failed manipulation checks.  However, means in all the 
revision investing variables were significantly higher for those who failed manipulation checks 
(p<.10) indicating that they did not process the IC disclosure.  The risk of misstatement means 
were also significantly lower (1-tailed, p<.10) for those who failed manipulation checks  
                                                          
15 An agreement for non-payment of manipulation failure observations led to an error on the survey company’s 
programming logic that terminated 81 manipulation failure observations before they responded to the post 
experimental questionnaire.  This issue was corrected half way into the data collection leaving 116 manipulation 
failure observations with completed responses. 
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Table 5.1. Descriptive Statistics by Manipulation Failure 
Manipulation checks Passed n = 164 Failed n = 116 p-value 
  Mean Std. dev Mean Std. dev (2-tailed sig.) 
Duration 1097.98 2104.68 955.76 760.80 0.487 
Age 56.32 14.65 57.29 14.28 0.579 
Investing experience 18.77 15.37 33.57 185.75 0.311 
Work experience 25.31 14.83 25.09 15.43 0.902 
Reliance on financial advisors 3.41 2.16 3.58 2.09 0.513 
Education (1-none,7-doctorate) 4.77 1.30 4.47 1.35 0.056 
Business degree (1=yes, 0=no) 0.31 0.46 0.29 0.46 0.750 
Accounting courses 2.38 3.87 2.01 2.72 0.369 
Finance courses 1.97 2.89 1.42 1.82 0.072 
Financial literacy 8.41 1.96 7.62 2.26 0.002 
Risk preference (0-risk averse, 3-
risk seeking) 0.66 0.94 0.97 1.05 0.011 
Processing fluency 4.55 1.38 4.47 1.24 0.605 
Severity of overall ICW reported 4.61 1.29 4.58 1.24 0.835 
Likelihood of material error of 
overall ICW reported   61.16 19.36 58.45 18.01 0.236 
Familiarity with 10k reports 4.16 1.54 3.78 1.43 0.040 
IC understanding check 2.85 1.42 2.97 1.29 0.468 
Self-assessed IC understanding 3.88 1.48 3.59 1.39 0.099 
ICFR influences my investing 
decision 5.08 1.18 4.67 1.27 0.006 
MD&A reading frequency 2.37 0.87 2.21 0.82 0.125 
Audit report reading frequency 2.21 0.91 2.36 0.94 0.183 
Footnotes reading frequency 2.25 0.88 2.36 0.90 0.299 
Reliability of IC report 3.70 1.38 3.74 1.39 0.811 
Management competence 4.08 1.47 3.97 1.39 0.547 
Management trustworthiness 3.91 1.44 3.89 1.35 0.876 
Risk of misstatement 6.04 1.95 5.66 1.97 0.118 
Baseline impression of investment 4.51 1.15 4.36 1.10 0.275 
Baseline invested amount 2314.47 2518.00 2521.59 2582.87 0.503 
Baseline likelihood of price 
decline/increase  9.84 2.08 10.06 2.02 0.381 
Revised impression of investment 3.26 1.30 3.65 1.22 0.013 
Revised invested amount 1266.42 2091.27 1774.57 2328.14 0.057 
Revised likelihood of price 
decline/increase 7.38 2.77 8.29 2.60 0.006 
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indicating that they perceived the investment as lower risk.  Participants who failed manipulation 
checks may not have read, understood, or cared to incorporate the ICW disclosure, providing 
more rationale to exclude these participants in hypothesis testing.   
Processing fluency was also measured after the manipulations by asking participants the 
following question: “The specific section discussing the internal control issue(s) disclosed was 
clearly presented/easy to understand” (1-Strongly disagree, 7- Strongly agree).  Participants who 
briefly glanced at the IC report should be able to indicate higher scores than those who failed to 
attend to the task.  To test this notion, I ran separate ANOVA models that test the differences in 
the mean of processing fluency for the group of participants who failed the manipulation check 
questions and those who passed the manipulation check.  As depicted in Figure 4, participants 
who passed the manipulation check questions indicated higher processing fluency scores in the 
salient conditions than in the stealth conditions (significant ANOVA and main effect of salience, 
F=16.419 p<.001).  Conversely, participants who failed manipulation check questions indicated 
no difference in their processing fluency responses and even higher means in the disaggregated 
condition for stealth conditions rather than the salient condition (insignificant ANOVA and 
salience is not significant, F=.939, p=.334).  It is apparent that those who failed the manipulation 
check question were clearly not paying attention or did not spend ample time reviewing the IC 
report.   
In addition to manipulation and attention check questions, I followed Rose et al. (2010) 
and asked participants an understanding check question: “How does the presence of internal 
control weaknesses affect a company's financial reporting system?” (1-Negatively, 7- 
Positively).  Similar to Rose et al. (2010), investors’ appeared to have an understanding of the 
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negative effect of ICWs, indicated by a mean assessment of 2.85 which is less than the mid-point 
of 4.00 (t-value -10.341, p-value < .000). 
 
 
 Figure 4.  Means of Processing Fluency by Manipulation Check (Fail/Pass) 
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5.2 Demographic Statistics 
Fifty-seven (34.8%) of the participants were female and 107 (65.2%) of the participants 
were male.  Participants had an average age of 56.32 years and average work experience of 25.31 
years.16  They had an average investing experience of 18.77 years and on average indicated 3.41 
as the extent to which they would rely on financial advisor/ broker/ planner for investments ( 1- I 
manage all my investments on my own, 7-I let my financial advisor/planner handle all my 
investments).  The participants’ trading frequency was 1.34, a coded figure that refers to an 
average that is greater than 10 trades per year but less than 100 trades per year (1- Less than 10 
trades per year, 2- 10 to 100 trades per year, 3- 100 to 1000 trades per year, 4- Over 1,000 trades 
per year).  In terms of education level, the average participant had more coursework than an 
associate’s degree, but less than a bachelor’s degree.  Sixty-two participants (37.8%) had 
graduated with a bachelor’s degree and 43 participants (26.2%) had graduated with a master’s 
degree.  Fifty-one participants (31.1%) indicated that they have a business degree. Participants 
had completed an average of 2.38 accounting courses and 1.97 finance courses.  Participants had 
an average score of 8.41 out of 11 on a financial literacy scale taken from Van Rooij et al.(2011), 
indicating that they had at least moderate financial literacy as nonprofessional investors.  The 
time to complete the study took an average of 18.3 minutes.  The demographics and additional 
descriptive statistics of the study are included in Table 5.2.  A description of the variables used is 
tabulated on Table 4.2. 
  
                                                          
16 The relatively higher average age of participants likely resulted from screening out participants who were using 
mobile devices to complete the survey.   The pre-screening criteria of only allowing participants using personal 
computers was necessary because the online survey would not display correctly on mobile devices.  
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Table 5.2. Demographic and Participant Related Descriptive Statistics   
Variables 
Disaggregated 
/ Salient 
(n=42) 
Disaggregated 
/ Stealth  
(n=39) 
Aggregated 
/ Salient 
(n=41) 
Aggregated 
/ Stealth 
(n=42) 
Total 
(n=164) 
  
 
Mean (s.d. or 
percent) 
Mean (s.d. or 
percent) 
Mean (s.d. 
or percent) 
Mean (s.d. 
or percent) 
Mean (s.d. 
or percent) 
p-
values 
Gender           0.904 
Female 16 (38%) 12 (31%) 15 (27%) 14 (23%) 57 (35%)   
Male 26 (62%) 27 (69%) 26 (63%) 28 (67%) 107 (65%)   
Age 53.33 57.21 55.78 59.00 56.32 0.343 
  (14.906) (14.893) (14.015) (14.723) (14.654)   
Professional work 
experience 
25.50 25.79 23.17 26.76 25.31 0.732 
(14.576) (14.977) (14.634) (15.424) (14.828)   
Investing experience 16.45 19.72 19.95 19.07 18.77 0.718 
  (11.89) (19.216) (15.643) (14.438) (15.366)   
Reliance on 
financial advisor 
3.71 3.03 3.17 3.69 3.41 0.351 
(2.028) (2.146) (2.024) (2.394) (2.156)   
Trading frequency 1.45 1.23 1.41 1.26 1.34 0.161 
  (.55) (.485) (.547) (.544) (.536)   
Education rank 4.57 5.00 4.63 4.90 4.77 0.381 
  (1.364) (1.277) (1.157) (1.394) (1.303)   
Business degree 13 (31%) 14 (36%) 12 (29%) 12 (29%) 51 (31%) 0.897 
Accounting courses 2.12 3.08 1.76 2.62 2.38 0.447 
  (3.329) (4.521) (2.606) (4.685) (3.871)   
Finance courses 1.62 2.69 1.80 1.81 1.97 0.346 
  (2.083) (4.317) (2.136) (2.521) (2.885)   
Financial literacy 8.21 8.46 8.34 8.62 8.41 0.810 
  (2.09) (2.024) (1.983) (1.766) (1.956)   
Risk preference 0.93 0.54 0.49 0.67 0.66 0.143 
  (1.113) (.822) (.952) (.816) (.943)   
Investment horizon 7.36 7.21 7.15 7.55 7.32 0.656 
  (1.206) (1.852) (1.636) (1.533) (1.562)   
Familiarity with 
10K reports 
4.29 4.77 4.05 3.57 4.16 0.005 
(1.293) (1.307) (1.731) (1.595) (1.543)   
Investor inactive 4.17 3.23 3.39 3.69 3.63 0.789 
 (4.752) (3.602) (2.999) (5.825) (4.424)   
MDNA reading 
frequency 
2.48 2.38 2.49 2.12 2.37 0.183 
(.833) (.847) (.898) (.889) (.872)   
Audit Report 
reading frequency 
2.38 2.26 2.27 1.95 2.21 0.159 
(.936) (.966) (.867) (.825) (.905)   
Footnotes  reading 
frequency 
2.40 2.28 2.27 2.05 2.25 0.313 
(.767) (.999) (.923) (.825) (.882)   
Self-assessed IC  3.90 4.28 4.00 3.38 3.88 0.046 
 understanding (1.284) (1.255) (1.581) (1.652) (1.48)   
ICFR influences  my 
investing decision 
4.95 5.36 5.00 5.02 5.08 0.404 
(.987) (1.203) (1.118) (1.388) (1.183)   
CDs vs MW 
severity rating 
4.62 4.82 4.63 4.50 4.64 0.689 
(1.188) (1.233) (1.178) (1.194) (1.192)   
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5.3 Descriptive Statistics of Dependent Variables and other Related Variables 
Table 5.3 shows the means and standard deviation for the dependent variables as well as 
other covariates.  The descriptive statistics on these variables is tabulated for the four 
experimental conditions along with the overall sample.  The mean (s.d.) risk of misstatement for 
the overall sample is 6.04 (1.95).  The aggregated/stealth condition had the highest mean risk of 
misstatement (6.50) and the aggregated/salient condition had the lowest mean risk of 
misstatement (5.63).  The revised investment judgment dependent variables reflected means that 
were lower than the midpoint as expected with the scenario of material weakness disclosures 
(bad news).  The means for the salient conditions were higher for revised impression of 
investment and revised investment amount.  The relatively low mean of baseline invested 
amount of 2,314.47 on a continuous range of possible entries of 0-to-10,000 indicates that the 
investment may have not been attractive enough to lead to investing the entire inheritance of 
$10,000.  The mean revised investment amount was 1,266.42.  The overall mean for revised 
likelihood of price decrease/ increase was 7.38, which was also below the midpoint of “8-No 
change.”    
Participants’ assessments of processing fluency were higher on average for the salient 
conditions than the stealth conditions.  The mean severity of overall ICW reported was 4.61 on a 
seven-point Likert scale (1-Very low severity, 7- Very high severity).  Assessments of likelihood 
of material error of overall ICW reported had a mean of 61.1 on a 101 point scale.  Participants’ 
average assessment of the reliability of the IC report was 3.70 on a seven-point Likert scale.  The 
mean management competence and trustworthiness were 4.08 and 3.91 respectively on seven-
point Likert scales. The IC understanding check variable, collected by asking how the presence 
of internal control weaknesses affects a company's financial reporting system, had a mean of 
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2.85 on a seven-point Likert scale (1-Negative, 7-Positive) indicating that participants 
understood the negative effect of internal control weaknesses on financial reporting.  A 
description of the variables used is tabulated on Table 4.2. 
5.4 Correlations among Dependent Variables and other Related Variables 
The Spearman correlation coefficients between the dependent variables and other 
covariates are listed in Table 5.4.  There is a significant negative correlation between the risk of 
misstatement and revised investment judgments, reliability, management competence and trust 
measures.  Risk of misstatement is positively correlated with severity and likelihood measures 
for the ICWs.  The moderately strong correlation between the dependent variables indicated that 
the use of MANCOVA would be necessary.  A description of the variables used is tabulated on 
Table 4.2. 
Further examination of the correlation report tabulated in Table 5.4 and additional 
correlation analyses (not tabulated) between dependent variables and participants’ demographics 
and other possible covariates was necessary to select covariates for the models used in testing the 
hypotheses.  The inclusion criteria for covariates were four fold.  First, the potential covariate 
must be a continuous variable for inclusion in an ANCOVA model.  Second, there had to be a 
significant correlation between the dependent variable and any potential covariates.  Third, the 
correlation between the independent variables and covariates must be low.  Four, the correlation 
between covariates and other covariates must be low to avoid a problem of multi-collinearity.  
The coefficient threshold value of .20 is used to define low correlation between independent 
variables and covariates or among covariates (Evans 1996).  For instance, baseline invested 
amount and baseline impression of investment variables are highly correlated (r=.617) and 
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therefore preclude the use of revised invested amount and revised impression of investment as 
dependent variables in the same MANCOVA model.  
Table 5.3. Outcome Related Descriptive Statistics   
Variables 
Disaggrega-
ted / Salient  
(n=42) 
Disaggrega-
ted / Stealth  
(n=39) 
Aggregated  
/ Salient 
(n=41) 
Aggregated  
/ Stealth 
(n=42) 
Overall Sample Descriptive 
Statistics (n=164) 
 
Mean (s.d. 
or percent) 
Mean (s.d. 
or percent) 
Mean (s.d. 
or percent) 
Mean (s.d. 
or percent) 
Mean (s.d. 
or percent) 
Min Max 
Risk of 
misstatement 
5.93 6.08 5.63 6.50 6.04 0 10 
1.702 2.057 2.211 1.757 1.947     
Revised impression 
of investment 
3.60 2.90 3.49 3.05 3.26 1 7 
(1.326) (1.021) (1.381) (1.343) (1.301)     
Revised invested 
amount   
1846.43 974.87 1351.34 874.24 1266.42 0 10000 
(2,764.593) (1,454.899) (2,262.366) (1,482.704) (2,091.268)     
Revised likelihood 
of stock price 
decrease/increase 
8.00 6.62 7.34 7.50 7.38 1 14 
(2.585) (2.943) (2.652) (2.813) (2.768)     
Baseline 
impression of 
investment 
4.60 4.33 4.78 4.33 4.51 1 7 
(1.106) (1.243) (1.215) (1.028) (1.154)     
Baseline invested 
amount  
2703.69 2218.46 2302.56 2026.02 2314.47 0 10000  
(2900.946) (2355.336) (2721.35) (2043.269) (2517.995)     
Baseline likelihood 
of stock price 
decrease/increase 
9.79 9.74 9.80 10.02 9.84 2 15 
(1.317) (2.468) (2.502) (1.932) (2.084)     
Processing fluency 5.17 4.13 4.76 4.12 4.55 1 7 
  (1.034) (1.508) (1.392) (1.329) (1.385)     
Severity of overall 
ICW reported 
4.64 4.69 4.44 4.67 4.61 1 7 
(1.246) (1.321) (1.205) (1.426) (1.294)     
Likelihood of 
material error of 
overall ICW 
reported 
60.95 62.05 60.24 61.43 61.16 10 100 
(18.585) (18.09) (20.061) (21.135) (19.358)   
  
Reliability of IC 
report 
3.86 3.51 3.80 3.62 3.70 1 7 
(1.336) (1.449) (1.47) (1.268) (1.375)     
Management 
competence 
4.36 3.97 3.85 4.12 4.08 1 7 
(1.445) (1.564) (1.476) (1.4) (1.469)     
Management 
trustworthiness 
4.21 3.74 3.71 3.98 3.91 1 7 
(1.474) (1.428) (1.504) (1.352) (1.442)     
IC understanding 
check 
3.17 2.64 2.85 2.74 2.85 1 7 
(1.36) (1.423) (1.459) (1.432) (1.42)     
Duration of study 
(minutes) 
16.41 17.12 13.75 25.73 18.30     4  448  
(12.201) (7.53) (6.396) (67.589) (35.078)    
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Table 5.4. Spearman Correlation Report 
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Risk of 
misstatement 1.000 -.411
** -.249** -.261** -.079 -.015 .098 .035 .493** .409** -.303** -.176** -.296** -.236** 
Revised 
impression of 
investment 
-.411** 1.000 .651** .616** .487** .331** .093 .113 -.461** -.464** .460** .356** .403** .230** 
Revised 
invested amount -.249
** .651** 1.000 .579** .532** .680** .287** .137* -.306** -.286** .376** .365** .360** .119 
Revised 
likelihood of 
stock price 
decrease/ 
increase 
-.261** .616** .579** 1.000 .360** .293** .343** .155** -.331** -.247** .443** .406** .465** .188** 
Baseline 
impression of 
investment 
-.079 .487** .532** .360** 1.000 .617** .522** .318** -.084 -.088 .216** .251** .269** .005 
Baseline 
invested amount -.015 .331
** .680** .293** .617** 1.000 .466** .198** -.021 -.052 .135* .254** .170** -.053 
Baseline 
likelihood of 
stock price 
decrease/ 
increase 
.098 .093 .287** .343** .522** .466** 1.000 .244** .037 .185** .087 .262** .089 -.031 
Processing 
fluency .035 .113 .137
* .155** .318** .198** .244** 1.000 .093 .075 .157** .234** .291** -.213** 
Severity of 
overall ICW 
reported 
.493** -.461** -.306** -.331** -.084 -.021 .037 .093 1.000 .700** -.329** -.276** -.240** -.261** 
Likelihood of 
material error of 
overall ICW 
reported 
.409** -.464** -.286** -.247** -.088 -.052 .185** .075 .700** 1.000 -.260** -.200** -.228** -.244** 
Reliability of 
the IC report -.303
** .460** .376** .443** .216** .135* .087 .157** -.329** -.260** 1.000 .714** .682** .070 
Management 
competence -.176
** .356** .365** .406** .251** .254** .262** .234** -.276** -.200** .714** 1.000 .751** .030 
Management 
trustworthiness -.296
** .403** .360** .465** .269** .170** .089 .291** -.240** -.228** .682** .751** 1.000 -.003 
IC report 
effectiveness 
check 
-.236** .230** .119 .188** .005 -.053 -.031 -.213** -.261** -.244** .070 .030 -.003 1.000 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed). 
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5.5 Statistical Assumptions 
The statistical tests that were used for hypotheses testing require the use of MANCOVA 
and ANCOVA.  MANCOVA and ANCOVA require certain assumptions to be met to reliably 
make inferences.  The assumptions of MANCOVA include: multivariate normality of the 
dependent variables and equality of variance-covariance matrices between the experimental 
conditions for each dependent variable.  The assumptions for ANCOVA include normality and 
homogeneity of variances.  
5.5.1 Tests of Normality  
The multivariate normality assumption of MANCOVA was examined in two ways.  First, 
I examined histogram plots of each dependent variable to determine if the distribution is close to 
the bell shaped curved.  The histogram plots of the four dependent variables are depicted in 
Figure 5.  Examining these plots indicates that the invested amount dependent variable had 
severe violation of the normality assumption as 78 of the 164 observations had zero values.  The 
rest of the dependent variables appeared to be normally distributed for the overall plots as well as 
the plots by treatment condition (not depicted).   Second, I performed the Shapiro-Wilks test of 
normality across the treatment conditions.  The invested amount dependent variable was not 
normally distributed across all experimental conditions as assessed by the Shapiro-Wilks test 
(p<.001).  The Shapiro-Wilks test also revealed that the revised impression of investment was 
not normally distributed as indicated by significance in the stealth conditions (p<.01) and salient 
conditions (p<.05).  Risk of misstatement was normally distributed across all conditions (p >.05).  
Revised likelihood of price decrease/ increase was normally distributed in all but one condition 
(p>.05) – the distribution of this variable in the aggregated/salient condition had a slight 
normality violation (p =.049).   
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Figure 5.  Normality Histogram Plots 
 
MANCOVA and ANCOVA are robust to the normality assumption if the violation of 
normality is not severe.  I was able to judge whether the violation of normality was severe by 
examining the histogram plots for the variables that were flagged by the significance in the 
Shapiro-Wilks test of normality.  The histograms depicted on Figure 5 indicate that the 
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distribution of the impression of investment variable was close to normal17; however, the 
distribution of invested amount was negatively skewed and an extreme violation of normality.  
As a result, I chose not to rely on the robustness assumption for such an extreme violation of 
normality and did not include the invested amount variable in the MANCOVA models.  
5.5.2 Tests of Homogeneity of Variance-Covariance Matrices and Equality of 
Error Variances 
I tested the homogeneity of variance-covariance matrices and the equality of error 
variances across conditions for MANCOVA and ANCOVA assumptions, respectively.  The 
homogeneity of variance-covariance matrices for dependent variables risk of misstatement, 
revised impression of investment, and revised likelihood of stock price decrease/increase was 
assessed using the Box’s M test.  Box’s M test is very sensitive and is normally considered 
significant if the p-value is lower than .001 (Tabachnick and Fidell 2001).  The results from 
Box’s test indicated that there is no evidence of violation of homogeneity of variance-covariance 
matrices (p = .002).   
I performed the Levene’s test of equality of error variances to test the assumptions for the 
ANCOVAs that were run following the MANCOVA test.  This test was performed on all four 
dependent variables, including the revised invested amount variable, since outcome differences 
across experimental conditions were also tested using ANCOVA models.  The results on the 
Levene’s test of equality of error variances indicates that the equality of error variances 
assumption was not violated for any dependent variable (p>.05). 
                                                          
17 Exclusion of the impression of investment variable leads to qualitatively similar (stronger) results and the 
MANCOVA model/interaction remain significant (stronger). 
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5.6 Tests of Hypotheses 
Hypothesis testing was performed using a MANCOVA model followed by separate 
ANCOVA analyses on the misstatement risk variable and the investing judgment variables. The 
dependent variables that are initially tested in the MANCOVA model are risk of misstatement, 
revised impression of investment, and revised likelihood of stock price decrease/increase18.   The 
MANCOVA (as opposed to a MANOVA) model in the pre-post experimental design is 
necessary because the interest of this study is in interpreting the final investing judgments, 
ceteris paribus, which would require controlling for baseline assessments.  I use the revised 
assessments as dependent variables and control for the baseline statistically instead of 
constructing difference scores in the dependent variable.  The reasoning for using the revision 
dependent variables with baseline covariates is the benefit of allowing the coefficient on each 
observation to vary rather than assuming that the coefficient is fixed.  Additionally, the use of 
difference scores between dependent variables has the draw back that assumes that revisions are 
similar regardless of whether the initial baseline is closer to the floor or ceiling of the scales and 
follows the assumption that all participants are affected similarly by their initial assessments 
regardless of their baseline scores).   
Hypothesis 1 and 2 posit that there will be a main effect of presentation salience of ICWs 
disclosed in IC reports on the risk of misstatement and investing judgments such that 
nonprofessional investors viewing an IC report that clearly identifies the diagnostic information 
(bulleted material weakness disclosure) will respond less negatively to the internal control 
weakness than those viewing an IC report that less clearly identifies the diagnostic information 
                                                          
18 The revised invested amount variable was left out of the MANCOVA model due to severe violation of normality 
and inability to use its related baseline invested amount variable as a covariate due to multi-collinearity concerns. 
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(in-text material weakness disclosure).   As a preliminary step, I used Spearman coefficients of 
correlation to conduct univariate tests between the salience independent variable and each of the 
four dependent variables.  Salience was significantly correlated with revised impression of 
investment (p=.009) and revised invested amount (p=.085).  Salience was marginally 
significantly correlated with revised likelihood of stock price decrease/increase (p=.104) and risk 
of misstatement (p=.103).  The descriptive statistics tabulated on Table 5.5 indicate that the 
means in the salient conditions for the dependent variables are more favorable than the means in 
stealth conditions.  ANOVA tests on the revised and baseline investment judgment variables 
indicate that salience was significant (one-tailed p<.05) across all the revised dependent variables 
and the baseline variable for impression of investment (p<.05).  An ANCOVA model testing the 
main effect of salience on revised impression of investment with salience included as a factor 
and  baseline of impression of investment inserted as a covariate returns a significant overall 
model (p<.001), and salience remains significant (p=.035).    The preliminary evidence of the 
main effect of salience on the risk of misstatement and investing judgments was followed by 
controlled multivariate tests. 
The dependent variables that are included in the MANCOVA test are risk of 
misstatement, revised impression of investment, and revised likelihood of stock price 
decrease/increase. The result of the MANCOVA test is included in Table 5.6.  There was a 
significant interaction between salience and disaggregation in the MANCOVA model (p<.10).  
This indicates that there are statistically significant differences in the means across the conditions 
even after accounting for the correlation among the dependent variables in the study.  To further 
investigate the significance of the interaction between the two independent variables, individual 
ANCOVA models are required to tease out the dependent variables that might be driving the 
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results.  The main effects in the MANCOVA are not interpretable when the interaction is 
significant; however, if the interaction in a subsequent ANCOVA test is not significant, the main 
effects can be interpreted to test Hypotheses.  
 
Table 5.5.  Univariate Tests by Presentation Salience 
Panel A. Descriptive statistics by presentation salience 
Presentation salience 
Risk of 
misstatement 
Revised 
impression 
of 
investment 
Revised 
invested 
amount 
Revised 
likelihood 
of stock 
price 
decrease/ 
increase 
Baseline 
impression 
of 
investment 
Baseline 
invested 
amount 
Baseline 
likelihood 
of stock 
price 
decrease/ 
increase 
Stealth Mean 6.30 2.98 922.69 7.07 4.33 2118.68 9.89 
S.d.  (1.907) (1.193) (1461.059) (2.893) (1.129) (2187.267) (2.197) 
N 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 
Salient Mean 5.78 3.54 1601.87 7.67 4.69 2505.54 9.80 
S.d. (1.963) (1.346) (2525.913) (2.623) (1.157) (2803.750) (1.980) 
N 83 83 83 83 83 83 83 
Difference 
(Salient 
vs. 
Stealth) 
Diff. -0.51 0.57 679.18 0.60 0.35 386.86 -0.09 
Sig. (1- 
tailed) p=0.046 p=0.003 p=0.019 p=0.083 p=0.025 p=0.164 p=0.387 
Panel B.  Spearman coefficient of correlation 
Independent  
variable 
Risk of 
misstatement 
Revised 
impression 
of 
investment 
Revised 
invested 
amount 
Revised 
likelihood 
of stock 
price 
decrease/ 
increase 
Baseline 
impression 
of 
investment 
Baseline 
invested 
amount 
Baseline 
likelihood 
of stock 
price 
decrease/ 
increase 
Salience 
Coefficient -.128 0.202 .127 .135 .153 .032 -.053 
Sig. (2-
tailed) .103 .009 .104 .085 .051 .683 .497 
N 164 164 164 164 164 164 164 
 
The purpose of MANCOVA and ANCOVA differ in that while MANCOVA tries to 
explain the variation in the latent unobserved construct represented by the dependent variables, 
ANCOVA directly tests whether the means of each observed dependent variable varies across 
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the treatment conditions (Haase and Ellis 1987; Huberty and Morris 1989; Warne 2014).  
Therefore, while the MANCOVA can help us understand whether salience and disaggregation 
affect all investing judgments, the ANCOVA can determine which one of the investing 
judgments are affected by the factors or a combination of the factors.  Additionally, independent 
ANCOVAs have the advantage of additional power since one can include (exclude) certain 
variables that may only be related to some dependent variables but not related to others. 
 
5.6.1 Risk of Misstatement (Tests of Hypotheses 1 and 3) 
I ran a separate ANCOVA model to test whether there was a main effect of ICW 
presentation salience on risk of misstatement.  The covariate inclusion criteria that was discussed 
in the correlation analysis section (5.4) was followed to select covariates.  The following 
covariates are significantly correlated with risk of misstatement:  Severity of overall ICW 
reported, Likelihood of material error of overall ICW reported, Reliability of IC report, 
Table 5.6.  Multivariate Test of MANCOVAa 
Effect Value F Hypothesis df Error df Sig. 
Intercept Pillai's Trace 0.374 31.049
b 3 156 0.000 
Wilks' Lambda 0.626 31.049b 3 156 0.000 
Baseline likelihood of 
stock price decrease/ 
increase 
Pillai's Trace 0.204 13.291b 3 156 0.000 
Wilks' Lambda 0.796 13.291b 3 156 0.000 
Baseline impression of 
investment 
Pillai's Trace 0.287 20.960b 3 156 0.000 
Wilks' Lambda 0.713 20.960b 3 156 0.000 
Disaggregated Pillai's Trace 0.000 .024
b 3 156 0.995 
Wilks' Lambda 1.000 .024b 3 156 0.995 
Salience  Pillai's Trace 0.024 1.256
b 3 156 0.292 
Wilks' Lambda 0.976 1.256b 3 156 0.292 
Disaggregated*Salience Pillai's Trace 0.042 2.267
b 3 156 0.083 
Wilks' Lambda 0.958 2.267b 3 156 0.083 
a. Risk of misstatement, revised likelihood of stock price decrease/ increase, revised impression of investment:  Intercept + baseline 
likelihood of stock price decrease/ increase + baseline impression of investment + disaggregated + salience + disaggregated * salience 
b. Exact statistic 
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Management trustworthiness, Management competence, IC understanding check, ICFR 
influences my investing decision, and MD&A reading frequency.  Upon further investigation of 
these potential covariates, multiple correlation analysis indicated that several variables were 
highly correlated (coefficients > .60): (i) Severity of overall ICW reported with Likelihood of 
material error of overall ICW reported, (ii) Reliability of IC report with Management 
trustworthiness, and Management competence.  Since these variables possibly measured the 
same construct, I included just Severity of overall ICW reported and Reliability of IC report in 
subsequent models. Additionally, to satisfy the conditions of an effective ANCOVA, any 
significant correlation between a covariate and the independent variables or another covariate 
that exceeded a coefficient of .20 led to the removal of that covariate (Evans 1996)19. 
Inclusion of the potential covariates in an ANCOVA model revealed that several 
variables that were significantly correlated with risk of misstatement were not significant.  Other 
potential covariates that were correlated with each other were included in the model one at the 
time. The most parsimonious model that is listed below was used to test the hypotheses related to 
the risk of misstatement (H1 & H3).   Table 5.7 shows that the main effect of salience was 
significant in the model (p<.10).   Therefore, in a multivariate setting that incorporates ICW 
disaggregation type, I find support for Hypothesis 1 that presentation salience of ICWs leads to a 
lower perception of risk of misstatement by nonprofessional investors.  
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀 + 𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑀𝑀+ 𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀 ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑀𝑀 + 𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑜𝑜𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼 𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 +  𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷&𝐴𝐴 𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷 𝑜𝑜𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑓𝑓𝐽𝐽𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 
  
                                                          
19 Covariates that were correlated were each included in the original pre-post model without other covariates.  None 
of the covariates included led to loss of significance on the factors and led to qualitatively similar findings. 
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Table 5.7. ANCOVA Tests on Risk of Misstatement  
Panel A.  Descriptive Statistics: DV =  Risk of misstatement (0- No chance, 10- Highly likely) 
          
Means        
(Standard deviation) 
  
  ICW disaggregation type    
 {sample size}  Aggregated Disaggregated Total 
Pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
Sa
lie
nc
e 
Salient 
(high) 
5.63 5.93 5.78 
(2.21) (1.70) (1.96) 
{41} {42} {83} 
Stealth (low) 
6.50 6.08 6.30 
(1.76) (2.06) (1.91) 
{42} {39} {81} 
  
Total 
6.07 6.00 6.04 
  (2.03) (1.87) (1.95) 
  {83} {81} {164} 
Panel B.  ANCOVA: DV =  Risk of misstatement (0- No chance, 10- Highly likely) 
 
Source  df 
Sum of 
Squares 
Mean 
Square F p-value   
Model  5 172.309a 34.462 12.223 0.000   
Error  158 445.471 2.819     
Corrected Total 163 617.780      
         
Source  df 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares 
Mean 
Square F p-value   
Disaggregated 1 1.509 1.509 0.535 0.465   
Salience 1 9.846 9.846 3.492 0.064   
Disaggregated * Salience 1 4.916 4.916 1.743 0.189   
MD&A reading frequency 1 16.788 16.788 5.954 0.016   
Severity of ICW reported 1 86.473 86.473 31.505 0.000   
       
a. R Squared = .279 (Adjusted R Squared = .256)  
Panel C.  Planned contrast tests* 
      t-value 
p-value 
(1-tailed)   
Risk of misstatement  1.209 0.115   
 
*Contrast weights: Disaggregated-salient, Disaggregated-stealth, Aggregate-salient, Aggregate-stealth (-2, 2, -1, 1) 
Panel D.  Post-hoc comparison of means 
      t-value 
p-value 
(1-tailed)   
Salient/disaggregated vs. Stealth/disaggregated  -0.355 0.362   
Salient/aggregated vs. Stealth/aggregated   -1.978 0.026   
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Hypothesis 3 posits that there will be an interaction between ICW presentation salience 
and ICW disaggregation type such that the mean risk of misstatement differs by salience only 
when the ICW disaggregation type is disaggregated (multiple control deficiencies that aggregate 
to one material weakness).  Table 5.7 presents the model used to test whether the interaction was 
significant in the ANCOVA model.  The lack of significance on the interaction between salience 
and disaggregation indicates that the effect of salience on the risk of misstatement does not 
depend on whether the ICW is disaggregated (p=.12).  A planned contrast test of the patterns 
predicted in hypothesis 3 (in conjunction with hypothesis 1) was also not significant (p>.10)20; 
thus, no support is provided for Hypothesis 3.  Figure 6 depicts the findings related to risk of 
misstatement. 
 
Figure 6.  Means of Risk of Misstatement 
                                                          
20 The planned contrast was likely closer to significance due to the main effect test of salience built into the test.  
Contrast weights:  Disaggregated-salient, Disaggregate-stealth, Aggregate-salient, Aggregate-stealth (-2, 2, -1, 1) 
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In a search for an alternative explanation for the nearly significant interaction variable 
and pattern depicted on Figure 6, I performed two post-hoc t-tests21 by comparing 
salient/aggregated vs. stealth/aggregated and salient/disaggregated vs. stealth/disaggregated.  The 
1-tailed t-test statistic was not significant in the test that compared salient/disaggregated vs. 
stealth/disaggregated (p=.362).  Interestingly, the 1-tailed t-test (one-tailed) was significant in the 
test that compared salient/aggregated vs. stealth/aggregated (p=.026).  This finding provides 
support for the notion that there is an interaction between salience and disaggregation; however, 
salience is only important when the ICW is in an aggregated format.  One potential explanation 
for the result that aggregation matters is likely due to the operationalization of aggregation.  
Higher risk of misstatement is likely associated with aggregation since the ICW is disclosed as a 
material weakness in the aggregated condition.  Therefore, in considering the risk of a “material” 
misstatement, investors may be primed to think of materiality, and thus may be more likely to be 
affected when a “material” weakness is present.  Moreover, this should lead investors to expect a 
weakness that is material (important in this sense) to be presented saliently but not so when the 
material weakness is a result of multiple control deficiencies.   
5.6.2 Investing Judgments (Tests of Hypotheses 2 and 4) 
Hypotheses 2 and 4 deal with the effect of ICW presentation salience and ICW 
disaggregation type on investing judgments. These hypotheses were tested using separate 
ANCOVA models for the three investing judgment dependent variables that were captured.  
Similar to the risk of misstatement model, covariates included for each dependent variable were 
determined based on multiple correlational analyses.  The covariate inclusion criteria that were 
                                                          
21 I performed two planned test instead of pairwise comparisons to avoid testing comparisons that are not of interest.  
Performing pairwise comparisons reduces power to control for the experiment wise error rate.  
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discussed in the correlation analysis section (5.4) were followed to select covariates.  The results 
for the tests of Hypotheses 2 and 4 will be presented following the subsections discussing the 
separate tests on the investing judgment dependent variables. 
5.6.2.1 Impression of investment 
Multiple correlational analyses between impression of investing and possible covariates 
indicated that the dependent variable has significant correlation with: Severity of overall ICW 
reported, Likelihood of material error of overall ICW reported, Reliability of IC report, 
Management trustworthiness, Management competence, IC understanding check, ICFR 
influences my investing decision, Risk preference, Trading frequency, and Investor dormant 
(months).  Trading frequency was significantly correlated with the salience factor and was 
subsequently removed after noting that the ANCOVA model with only baseline impression is 
not qualitatively affected by including trading frequency as an additional covariate. As indicated 
before, likelihood of material error and the management trust and competence variables were 
removed from the ANCOVA model to avoid multi-collinearity issues.  Due to the significant 
correlations among Severity of overall ICW reported, IC understanding check and Reliability of 
IC report, the variables were included in the model one at a time.  The effect of each variable 
was quantitatively similar; therefore, I selected the severity variable based on theoretical 
expectations and literature that indicates severity as an important variable. .  The most 
parsimonious model for the tests performed using impression of investment as a dependent is 
listed below and included on Table 5.8. 
𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑀𝑀 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀 + 𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑀𝑀+ 𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀 ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑀𝑀 + 𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑟𝑟𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑀𝑀 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀+ 𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑜𝑜𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼 𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 +  𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑜𝑜𝐷𝐷 𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 
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Table 5.8. ANCOVA Tests on Impression of Investment  
Panel A.  Descriptive Statistics 
DV =  Revised Impression of Investment (1-Very unfavorable, 7-Very favorable) 
Means 
(Standard deviation) 
  
  ICW disaggregation type    
 {sample size}  Aggregated Disaggregated Total 
Pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
Sa
lie
nc
e Salient (high) 
3.49 3.60 3.54 
(1.38) (1.33) (1.35) 
{41} {42} {83} 
Stealth (low) 
3.05 2.90 2.98 
(1.34) (1.02) (1.19) 
{42} {39} {81} 
  
Total 
3.27 3.26 3.26 
  (1.37) (1.23) (1.35) 
  {83} {81} {164} 
Panel B.  ANCOVA  
DV =  Revised Impression of Investment (1-Very unfavorable, 7-Very favorable) 
 
Source  df 
Sum of 
Squares 
Mean 
Square F p-value   
Corrected Model  6 120.098a 20.016 20.193 0.000   
Error  157 155.628 0.991     
Corrected Total  163 275.726      
         
Source  df 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares 
Mean 
Square F p-value   
Disaggregated 1 0.216 0.216 0.218 0.641   
Salience 1 4.925 4.925 4.968 0.027   
Disaggregated * Salience 1 2.134 2.134 2.152 0.144   
Baseline impression of investment 1 51.085 51.085 51.536 0.000   
Severity of ICW reported 1 37.213 37.213 37.541 0.000   
Investor dormant 1 3.565 3.565 3.597 0.060   
         
a. R Squared = .436 (Adjusted R Squared = .414) 
Panel C.  Planned contrast tests* 
      t-value†  
p-value 
(1-tailed)   
Revised impression of investment    2.893 0.001   
          
*Contrast weights: Disaggregated-salient, Disaggregated-stealth, Aggregate-salient, Aggregate-stealth (2,- 2, 1, -1) 
†Does not assume equal variances   
Panel D.  Planned t-test comparison of means 
      t-value 
p-value 
(1-tailed)   
Salient/disaggregated vs. Stealth/disaggregated   2.664 0.005   
Salient/aggregated vs. Stealth/aggregated   1.473 0.073   
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Tests of significance on the main effect of salience on investing judgments (Hypothesis 
2) is supported for the impression of investment measure (p=.027).  The presentation of 
diagnostic ICW information in a salient manner was viewed favorably by participants when 
compared to the less salient form of communicating the same ICW information.  This finding 
provides support for hypothesis 2 as it relates to the impression of investment variable. Tests of 
the interaction of salience and disaggregation indicated that the interaction variable was not 
significant in the ANCOVA model.   
 
 
Figure 7.  Means of Revised Impression of Investment 
 
66 
 
A planned contrast test was performed to test Hypothesis 4 as it relates to impression of 
investment22.  The planned contrast test that is presented in Panel C of Table 5.8 provides 
support for Hypothesis 4, in that the effect of salience on investing was amplified when the 
disaggregation type is disaggregated (p=.002).  Additional post-hoc Bonferroni comparison of 
means (not tabulated) indicates that the only significant difference (p=.046) between salient and 
stealth conditions was when these conditions were of disaggregated type (MW due to 
combination of control deficiencies).  Hypothesis 4 as it related to impression of investment was 
supported.  Figure 7 depicts the means of impression of investment across the experimental 
conditions. 
5.6.2.2 Likelihood of stock price decrease / increase 
Multiple correlational analyses between likelihood of stock price decrease/increase and 
possible covariates indicated that this dependent variable was significantly correlated with: 
Severity of overall ICW reported, Likelihood of material error of overall ICW reported, 
Reliability of IC report, Management trustworthiness, Management competence, IC 
understanding check, ICFR influences my investing decision, Risk preference, Reliance on 
financial advisors, and Investor dormant (months). As indicated before, likelihood of material 
error and the management trust and competence variables were removed from the ANCOVA 
model to avoid multi-collinearity issues.  Risk preference and IC report understanding check 
were not significant in the model and were consequently removed.  Due to the significant 
correlation between Severity of overall ICW reported and Reliability of IC report, the variables 
were inserted one at a time and produced qualitatively similar results on the significance of the 
                                                          
22 Planned contrast weights for all investing judgment models:  Disaggregated-salient, Disaggregate-stealth, 
Aggregate-salient, Aggregate-stealth (2, -2, 1, -1) 
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factors.  The most parsimonious model for the tests performed using revised likelihood of stock 
price decrease/increase as a dependent variable is presented below Table 5.9. 
Table 5.9. ANCOVA Tests on Likelihood of Stock Price Decrease / Increase 
Panel A.  Descriptive statistics: DV =  Revised likelihood of price decrease / increase (-7 High 
likelihood of decline, 0 No change, +7 High likelihood of price increase; recoded as 1-15) 
Means  
(Standard deviation) 
  
  ICW disaggregation type    
 {sample size}  Aggregated Disaggregated Total 
Pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
Sa
lie
nc
e Salient (high) 
7.34 8.00 7.67 
(2.65) (2.59) (2.62) 
{41} {42} {83} 
Stealth (low) 
7.50 6.62 7.07 
(2.81) (2.94) (2.89) 
{42} {39} {81} 
  
Total 
7.42 7.33 7.38 
  (2.72) (2.83) (2.77) 
  {83} {81} {164} 
Panel B.  ANCOVA: DV =  Revised likelihood of price decrease / increase (-7 High likelihood of 
decline, 0 No change, +7 High likelihood of price increase; recoded as 1-15)  
Source  df 
Sum of 
Squares 
Mean 
Square F p-value   
Corrected Model  6 359.732a 59.955 10.590 0.000   
Error  157 888.829 5.661     
Corrected Total  163 1248.561      
Source  df 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares 
Mean 
Square F p-value   
Disaggregated 1 0.064 0.064 0.011 0.915   
Salience 1 12.222 12.222 2.159 0.144   
Disaggregated * Salience 1 16.162 16.162 2.855 0.093   
Baseline likelihood of price 
decrease/increase 1 140.513 140.513 24.820 0.000  
Severity of ICW reported 1 106.046 106.046 18.732 0.000   
Reliance on financial advisors 1 35.633 35.633 6.294 0.013   
         
a. R Squared = .288 (Adjusted R Squared = .261) 
Panel C.  Planned contrast tests* 
      t-value † 
p-value 
(1-tailed)   
Revised likelihood of price decrease/increase   1.915 0.029   
          
*Contrast weights: Disaggregated-salient, Disaggregated-stealth, Aggregate-salient, Aggregate-stealth (2,- 2, 1, -1) 
†Assumes equal variances   
Panel D.  Post-hoc comparison of means 
      Tests 
p-value 
(1-tailed)   
Salient/disaggregated vs. Stealth/disaggregated   Bonferonni 0.075   
      Tukey 0.056   
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𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑅𝑅 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑜𝑜𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅 𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀 𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀/𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀 + 𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑀𝑀+ 𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀 ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑀𝑀 + 𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑅𝑅 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑜𝑜𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅 𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀 𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀/𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀 + 𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑜𝑜𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼 𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 +  𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑜𝑜𝑀𝑀 𝑜𝑜𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆 𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅 
The results of the ANCOVA analyses listed on Table 5.9 indicate that there was a 
significant interaction between salience and disaggregation (p<.10).  The main effect of salience 
is not significant in the ANCOVA model (p=.144).  Hypothesis 2 predicting a main effect of 
salience on investing judgments is not supported for this dependent variable.  Hypothesis 4 
predicts that there is an interaction such that the type of disaggregation determines the 
importance of salience.  Support for Hypothesis 4 is confirmed through a Bonferonni post-hoc 
comparison of means (p=.075) and a planned contrast test (p=.029).  Hypothesis 4 is supported 
for this dependent variable.  The pattern of means for the revised likelihood of stock price 
decrease/increase variable is depicted on Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8.  Means of Revised Likelihood of Stock Price Decline/Increase 
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5.6.2.3 Investment amount 
The investing amount dependent variable was not included in the MANCOVA that was 
initially performed due to severe violation of normality.  Further investigation of the data 
revealed that there were 36 participants who initially stated that they would not invest any of 
their $10,000 inheritance (baseline investment amount) prior to the revelation of a material 
weakness disclosure.  This floor effect prevented 36 of the participants from revising the 
investment amount downward and accounted for 36 of the 78 zeros that were contributing to the 
zero inflation problem on the revised investment amount variable.  To confirm that the floor 
effect was driven due to risk preferences of the participants, a comparison of means of the risk 
preferences covariate was performed between the participants who initially chose not to invest 
their inheritance and those who selected an amount greater than zero.  The results of the one-way 
ANOVA indicated that the mean risk preference for the group that chose not to invest was .22 
which was significantly lower than the mean of .78 for the group that initially chose to invest 
(p=.001). Although ANCOVA is robust to violations of normality, I analyzed the data with both 
the full sample and the non-zero baseline sample of 128 observations23 on subsequent analysis to 
provide confidence of the effectiveness of the ANCOVA on the revised investment dependent 
variable. 
Multiple correlational analyses was used to identify variables that were significantly 
correlated with the revised investment amount dependent variable.  Severity of overall ICW 
reported, Likelihood of material error of overall ICW reported, Reliability of IC report, 
Management trustworthiness, Management competence, IC understanding check, Risk 
preference, and Reliance on financial advisors were significantly correlated with Revised 
                                                          
23 ANCOVA models using the entire dataset produced qualitatively similar results and salience remains significant 
(p=.032).   
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investment amount.  IC understanding check was correlated with both Risk preference and 
Severity of overall ICW reported.  Reliance on financial advisors and Risk preference were not 
significant in the model and were subsequently removed.  The parsimonious model that is shown 
below is used to perform statistical tests that are included in Table 5.10. 
 
𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝑜𝑜𝐽𝐽𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 = 𝛽𝛽0 + 𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀 + 𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑀𝑀 + 𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀 ∗ 𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑜𝑜𝑀𝑀+ 𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝐴𝐴𝑀𝑀𝑜𝑜𝐽𝐽𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 + 𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑅𝑅𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜 𝑜𝑜𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑀𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼 𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑜𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑅𝑅 
 
The results of the ANCOVA test indicated that the overall model was significant 
(p<.001).  The effect of salience was statistically significant (p=.041) and indicated that the mean 
investment amount in salient conditions was significantly higher than that in stealth conditions.  
Hypothesis 2 was supported as it related to the investment amount dependent variable.  A 
planned contrast test was performed to test Hypothesis 4 and Hypothesis 2 together.  The 
planned contrast indicated that the model is statistically significant in the predicted direction of 
means across conditions (p=.0195, one-tailed).  Additionally, two planned t-test comparisons 
were performed to test whether the salient and stealth conditions were significantly different only 
in the disaggregated conditions.  The difference between salience and stealth conditions was 
significant within the disaggregated conditions (p=.039, one-tailed) but not in the aggregated 
conditions (p=.131). Hypothesis 4 was supported as it related to the investment amount 
dependent variable.  Figure 9 depicts the pattern of the means of revised invested amount 
dependent variable. 
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Table 5.10. ANCOVA Tests on Investment Amount 
Panel A.  Descriptive statistics: DV =  Revised Investment Amount ($0-$10,000 / open ended)   
 
Means  
(Standard deviation) 
  
  ICW disaggregation type   
 {sample size}  Aggregated Disaggregated Total 
Pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
Sa
lie
nc
e Salient (high) 
1351.34 1846.43 1601.87 
(2262.37) (2764.59) (2525.91) 
{41} {42} {83} 
Stealth 
(low) 
874.24 974.87 922.69 
(1482.70) (1454.90) (1461.06) 
{42} {39} {81} 
  
Total 
1109.92 1426.79 1266.42 
  (1911.42) (2261.52) (2091.27) 
  {83} {81} {164} 
Panel B.  ANCOVA: DV =  Revised Investment Amount ($0-$10,000 / open ended)  
Source  df Sum of Squares Mean Square F p-value 
Corrected 
Model  5 482366778.440a 96473355.688 66.130 0.000 
Error  158 230497549.529 1458845.250    
Corrected Total  163 712864327.970     
       
Source  df 
Type III Sum of 
Squares Mean Square F p-value 
Disaggregated 1 728359.484 728359.484 0.499 0.481 
Salience 1 6175553.823 6175553.823 4.233 0.041 
Disaggregated * Salience 1 946042.562 946042.562 0.648 0.422 
Baseline investment amount 1 435858064.190 435858064.190 298.769 0.000 
Severity of ICW reported 1 18060993.644 18060993.644 12.380 0.001 
        
a. R Squared = .677 (Adjusted R Squared = .666) 
Panel C.  Planned contrast tests* 
      t-value † 
p-value 
(1-tailed) 
Revised investment amount    2.096 0.0195 
         
*Contrast weights: Disaggregated-salient, Disaggregated-stealth, Aggregate-salient, Aggregate-stealth (2,- 2, 1, -1) 
 †Does not assume equal variances 
Panel D.  Planned t-test comparison of means 
      t-value 
p-value 
(1-tailed) 
Salient/disaggregated vs. Stealth/disaggregated   1.793 0.039 
Salient/aggregated vs. Stealth/aggregated   1.133 0.131 
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Figure 9.  Means of Revised Investment Amount 
 
5.6.2.4 Summary of hypotheses tests on investing judgments 
Hypothesis 2 predicting a favorable main effect of salience on investing judgments is 
supported by some but not all investment judgment dependent variables.  The test of the main 
effect of salience on the judgment of the overall impression of an investment and the decision to 
allocate an investment amount was significant.  However, the test of the main effect of salience 
on the investment outlook measured by the likelihood of the stock price decrease/increase was 
not significant.  
Hypothesis 4 predicted an interaction between salience and disaggregation of ICW 
diagnostic information such that the effect of salience is amplified when the disclosed ICW is 
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disaggregated because investors expect disaggregated ICW to be disclosed saliently.  Hypothesis 
4 was supported such that there was an interactive effect of salience and disaggregation on the 
investment outlook measured by the likelihood of the stock price decrease/increase and on the 
decision to allocate an investment amount by nonprofessional investors.  In contrast, there was 
no significant support of an interactive effect of salience and disaggregation on nonprofessional 
investors’ overall impression of the investment. Hypothesis 4 was not supported as it related to 
the impression of investment dependent variable. 
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6 ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS 
6.1 The Effect of Nonprofessional Investor Sophistication (Experience, Confidence, and 
Financial Literacy) 
Libby and Emett (2014) suggest that investing expertise and financial literacy may also 
work to mitigate the presentation formatting effects on investment judgments documented by 
Rennekamp (2012).  The literature on the use of numerosity heuristics also suggests that domain 
knowledge and expertise should attenuate the unpacking effects of disaggregation (Pelham et al. 
1994).  Unlike professional investors, nonprofessional investors are less able to integrate the 
relation between sections of reports such as financial statements (Maines and McDaniel 2000).  
Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that the combined effect of presentation salience and 
disaggregation will be different for sophisticated and unsophisticated nonprofessional investors. 
Three coarse measures of nonprofessional investor sophistication were collected in this 
study: investing experience, reliance on financial advisors, and financial literacy.  Reliance on 
financial advisors likely measures investor confidence, which is expected to be related to 
sophistication.   Financial literacy score was significantly positively correlated with years of 
investing experience and negatively correlated with reliance on financial advisors.  However, 
reliance on financial advisors and investing experience are not significantly correlated.  I 
constructed a measure of investor sophistication by combining these three variables using a two-
step procedure.  First, I performed a median split on all three variables and created three dummy 
variables. Second, I created a dichotomous sophistication variable which classified participants 
based on the majority classification on the original three categorical variables (2 out of 3).   
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A 2 x 2 x 2 MANCOVA model (not tabulated) was used to control for the correlation 
between perceptions of risk of misstatement, impressions of the investment, and likelihood of 
price increase/decrease.  Sophistication (Low=0, High=1) was added as the third factor to 
investigate interaction effects.  Adding sophistication to the MANCOVA model improved the 
significance on the interaction between disaggregation and salience (p=.062)24.  This indicates 
that the results that were obtained previously are not due to sophistication differences.   The three 
way interaction among the factors was also significant (p=.079), indicating that the extent to 
which our factors jointly affect nonprofessional investors depends on their sophistication level.    
A series of 2 x 2 x 2 ANCOVA models were used to obtain further insight on whether 
sophistication helps participants that fall prey to presentation and formatting effects of ICW 
disclosures.  Sophistication (Low=0, High=1) was included as the third factor and interacted with 
the independent variables in the prior ANCOVA models for each of the four dependent 
variables.   
Table 6.1 contains the means of risk of misstatement and the ANCOVA model that 
incorporates sophistication as a third factor.  There was a main effect of salience that remained 
significant, but no interaction between salience and disaggregation was observed.  Neither the 
main effect of sophistication nor the interaction between salience and sophistication was 
significant.  This result indicates that sophistication does not help nonprofessional investors to 
mitigate the presentation format effects of salience on their perceptions of misstatement risk.  
There was a significant three-way interaction between salience, disaggregation, and 
sophistication (p=.072).   
                                                          
24 I also included investing experience, reliance on financial advisors and financial literacy as covariates and find 
qualitatively similar results on the interaction between salience and disaggregation (p<.10).   
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As shown in Figure 10 the patterns of the means were different for unsophisticated and 
sophisticated nonprofessional investors.  Further planned contrast tests indicated that the 
predicted pattern for Hypotheses 1 and 3 holds for the higher sophistication group (p=.020) but 
was not significant for the lower sophistication group (p=.229).  Unsophisticated nonprofessional 
investors appeared to be considering material weaknesses as more important and expect material 
weaknesses to be disclosed saliently. 
 
 
 
Figure 10.  Means of Risk of Misstatement by Sophistication 
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Table 6.1. Additional Tests on Risk of Misstatement by Sophistication 
Panel A.  Descriptive Statistics: DV = Risk of misstatement (0-No chance, 10-Highly likely) 
Means  
(Standard deviation) ICW presentation 
salience 
  ICW disaggregation type  
 {sample size} Aggregated Disaggregated Total 
N
on
pr
of
es
si
on
al
 In
ve
st
or
 S
op
hi
st
ic
at
io
n 
Less 
Sophisticated 
Salient (high) 
5.50 6.19 5.87 
(2.33) (1.75) (2.04) 
{18} {21} {39} 
Stealth (low) 
6.68 5.07 5.97 
(1.46) (1.98) (1.87) 
{19} {15} {34} 
Total 
6.11 5.72 5.92 
(2.00) (1.91) (1.95) 
{37} {36} {73} 
More 
Sophisticated 
Salient (high) 
5.74 5.67 5.70 
(2.16) (1.65) (1.91) 
{23} {21} {44} 
Stealth (low) 
6.35 6.71 6.53 
(1.99) (1.88) (1.92) 
{23} {24} {47} 
Total 
6.04 6.22 6.13 
(2.08) (1.83) (1.95) 
{46} {45} {91} 
Panel B.  ANCOVA: DV =  Risk of misstatement (0-No chance, 10-Highly likely) 
Source   df 
Sum of 
Squares 
Mean 
Square F p-value 
Corrected Model  9 185.442a 20.605 7.339 0.000 
Error   154 432.339 2.807   
Corrected Total  163 617.780    
Source   df 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares 
Mean 
Square F p-value 
Disaggregated 1 2.587 2.587 0.921 0.339 
Salience 1 7.868 7.868 2.803 0.096 
Disaggregated * Salience 1 7.021 7.021 2.501 0.116 
Sophistication 1 0.209 0.209 0.075 0.785 
Sophistication * Disaggregated 1 2.725 2.725 0.971 0.326 
Sophistication * Salience 1 1.777 1.777 0.633 0.428 
Sophistication * Disaggregated * Salience 1 9.215 9.215 3.283 0.072 
MD&A Reading Frequency 1 14.345 14.345 5.110 0.025 
Severity of ICW reported 1 122.537 122.537 43.648 0.000 
       
a. R Squared = .300 (Adjusted R Squared = .259) 
 Panel C.  Planned contrast tests by Sophistication 
 t-value 
p-value 
(1-tailed) 
Risk of Misstatement at Sophistication = Low (0)   -0.748 0.229 
Risk of Misstatement at Sophistication = High (1)   2.089 0.020 
 
*Contrast weights: Disaggregated-salient, Disaggregated-stealth, Aggregate-salient, Aggregate-stealth (-2, 2, -1, 1) 
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Table 6.2 contains the means of revised impression of investment and the ANCOVA 
model that incorporates sophistication as a third factor.  There was a main effect of salience that 
remained significant after inclusion of sophistication in the model.  Sophistication and its 
interaction with the other factors were all insignificant.  Additional planned contrast tests 
indicated that nonprofessional investors with low sophistication behaved in the manner predicted 
in the hypotheses as it related to impression of investment (p=.014) and similar to those with 
high sophistication (p=.052).  Independent t-tests between the salient and stealth conditions were 
significant for the low sophistication group in both aggregated (p=.029) and disaggregated 
conditions (p=.015).  However, independent t-tests between the salient and stealth conditions for 
the high sophistication group were significantly different for only the disaggregated condition 
(p=.033) and not the aggregated condition (p=.454).  It appears that the results for the more 
sophisticated group provide support for Hypothesis 3 as it relates to impression of the 
investment.  Sophistication did not appear to be mitigating the effects of presentation format on 
investing judgments as it relates to participants’ impression of the investment in the 
disaggregated format.  Figure 11 depicts the means of impressions of the investment for each 
group of sophistication level. 
 
Figure 11.  Means of Revised Impression of Investment by Sophistication
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Table 6.2.  Additional Analysis on Impression of Investment by Sophistication 
Panel A.  Descriptive Statistics: 
DV =  Revised Impression of Investment (1-Very unfavorable, 7-Very favorable) 
Means         
(Standard deviation) ICW 
presentation 
salience 
 
ICW disaggregation type  
{sample size} Aggregated Disaggregated Total 
N
on
pr
of
es
si
on
al
 In
ve
st
or
 S
op
hi
st
ic
at
io
n 
Less 
Sophisticated 
Salient 
(high) 
3.89 3.76 3.82 
(1.45) (1.45) (1.43) 
{18} {21} {39} 
Stealth  
(low) 
2.95 3.07 3.00 
(1.47) (0.96) (1.26) 
{19} {15} {34} 
Total 
3.41 3.47 3.44 
(1.52) (1.30) (1.40) 
{37} {36} {73} 
More 
Sophisticated 
Salient 
(high) 
3.17 3.43 3.30 
(1.27) (1.21) (1.23) 
{23} {21} {44} 
Stealth  
(low) 
3.13 2.79 2.96 
(1.25) (1.06) (1.16) 
{23} {24} {47} 
Total 
3.15 3.09 3.12 
(1.25) (1.16) (1.20) 
{46} {45} {91} 
Panel B.  ANCOVA  
DV =  Revised Impression of Investment (1-Very unfavorable, 7-Very favorable) 
Source   df 
Sum of 
Squares 
Mean 
Square F p-value 
Corrected Model  10 122.429a 12.243 12.219 0.000 
Error   153 153.296 1.002    
Corrected Total  163 275.726     
Source   df 
Type III 
Sum of 
Squares 
Mean 
Square F p-value 
Disaggregated 1 0.173 0.173 0.172 0.679 
Salience 1 5.139 5.139 5.129 0.025 
Disaggregated * Salience 1 1.696 1.696 1.692 0.195 
Sophistication 1 0.938 0.938 0.936 0.335 
Sophistication * Disaggregated 1 0.219 0.219 0.219 0.641 
Sophistication * Salience 1 0.297 0.297 0.296 0.587 
Sophistication * Disaggregated * Salience 1 0.875 0.875 0.873 0.352 
Baseline impression of investment 1 46.784 46.784 46.694 0.000 
Severity of ICW reported 1 35.585 35.585 35.516 0.000 
Investor dormant 1 3.927 3.927 3.920 0.050 
a. R Squared = .444 (Adjusted R Squared = .408) 
 Panel C.  Planned contrast tests by Sophistication* 
  t-value 
p-value 
(1-tailed) 
Revised Impression of Investment = Low (0)    2.264 0.014 
Revised Impression of Investment at Sophistication = High (1)  1.649 0.0515 
*Contrast weights: Disaggregated-salient, Disaggregated-stealth, Aggregate-salient, Aggregate-stealth (2,- 2, 1, -1) 
80 
 
Table 6.3 contains the means of revised likelihood of stock price decrease/increase and 
the ANCOVA model that incorporates sophistication as a third factor.   The interaction between 
salience and disaggregation that was observed in the original model remained significant 
(p=.050).  Additionally, there was a significant interaction between salience and sophistication. 
Planned contrasts test performed on both groups indicated that the predicted model was 
significant for participants with low sophistication but not for those with high sophistication.  
Further analyses using independent t-tests indicated that sophisticated investors expected an 
aggregated MW to be presented in a less salient format (p=.093) but were not significantly 
affected (although in the predicted direction) by their expectations of having an MW 
disaggregated as a combination of control deficiencies to be presented saliently (p=.204).  As 
indicated in Figure 12, it appears that sophistication and presentation formats interact but in a 
slightly different way than initially predicted for the likelihood of stock price increase/decrease.  
 
 
Figure 12.  Means of Revised Likelihood of Stock Price Decrease/Increase by Sophistication 
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Table 6.3. Additional Analysis on Likelihood of Stock Price Decrease/Increase by Sophistication 
Panel A.  Descriptive Statistics: DV =  Revised likelihood of price decrease / increase (-7 High 
likelihood of decline, 0 No change, +7 High likelihood of price increase; recoded as 1-15)  
Means  
(Standard deviation) 
ICW 
presentation 
salience 
ICW disaggregation type  
 {sample size} Aggregated Disaggregated Total 
N
on
pr
of
es
si
on
al
 In
ve
st
or
 S
op
hi
st
ic
at
io
n 
Less 
Sophisticated 
Salient 
(high) 
8.22 8.71 8.49 
(2.65) (2.47) (2.53) 
{18} {21} {39} 
Stealth 
(low) 
7.16 6.67 6.94 
(2.14) (2.92) (2.49) 
{19} {15} {34} 
Total 
7.68 7.86 7.77 
(2.43) (2.82) (2.61) 
{37} {36} {73} 
More 
Sophisticated 
Salient 
(high) 
6.65 7.29 6.95 
(2.50) (2.55) (2.52) 
{23} {21} {44} 
Stealth 
(low) 
7.78 6.58 7.17 
(3.29) (3.02) (3.18) 
{23} {24} {47} 
Total 
7.22 6.91 7.07 
(2.94) (2.80) (2.86) 
{46} {45} {91} 
  
Panel B.  ANCOVA: DV =  Revised likelihood of price decrease / increase (-7 High likelihood of 
decline, 0 No change, +7 High likelihood of price increase; recoded as 1-15 ) 
Source   df 
Sum of 
Squares 
Mean 
Square F p-value 
Corrected Model  9 345.866a 38.430 6.556 0.000 
Error   154 902.695 5.862    
Corrected Total  163 1248.561     
Source   df 
Type III Sum 
of Squares 
Mean 
Square F p-value 
Disaggregated 1 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.988 
Salience 1 15.090 15.090 2.574 0.111 
Disaggregated * Salience 1 22.885 22.885 3.904 0.050 
Sophistication 1 1.678 1.678 0.286 0.593 
Sophistication * Disaggregated 1 1.493 1.493 0.255 0.614 
Sophistication * Salience 1 17.927 17.927 3.058 0.082 
Sophistication * Disaggregated * Salience 1 0.064 0.064 0.011 0.917 
Baseline likelihood of price change 1 129.196 129.196 22.041 0.000 
Severity of ICW reported 1 116.942 116.942 19.950 0.000 
        
a. R Squared = .277 (Adjusted R Squared = .235) 
 Panel C.  Planned contrast tests by Sophistication* 
  t-value 
p-value 
(1-tailed) 
Revised likelihood of price decrease/increase at Sophistication = Low (0) 2.707 0.005 
Revised likelihood of price decrease/increase at Sophistication = High (1) 1.444 0.443 
*Contrast weights: Disaggregated-salient, Disaggregated-stealth, Aggregate-salient, Aggregate-stealth (2,- 2, 1, -1) 
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Table 6.4 contains the means assessments of revised investment amount and the 
ANCOVA model that incorporates sophistication as a third factor.  Salience remained significant 
as was initially observed in the original model (p=.039).  There were no significant interactions 
between sophistication and the factors.  However, planned contrast tests performed on both 
groups indicated that the predicted model was only significant when sophistication was low 
(p=.003).  Further analyses using independent t-tests indicated that unsophisticated 
nonprofessional investors were affected by salience both in the aggregated and disaggregated 
conditions (p=.017, p=.036 respectively), but sophisticated nonprofessional investors were not 
affected by salience in either levels of disaggregation.   This finding indicates that sophistication 
appears to be mitigating the effects of presentation format on investing decisions, at least in the 
aggregated conditions.  Figure 13 displays the means of revised investment amounts by 
sophistication level. 
 
 
Figure 13.  Means of Revised Investment Amount by Sophistication 
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Table 6.4. Additional Tests on Investment Amount by Sophistication 
Panel A.  Descriptive Statistics: DV =  Revised Investment Amount ($0-$10,000 / open ended)   
Means  
(Standard deviation) 
ICW 
presentation 
salience 
ICW disaggregation type  
 {sample size} Aggregated Disaggregated Total 
N
on
pr
of
es
si
on
al
 In
ve
st
or
 S
op
hi
st
ic
at
io
n 
Less 
Sophisticated 
Salient 
(high) 
2183.61 2833.33 2533.46 
(2958.20) (3458.08) (3211.92) 
{18} {21} {39} 
Stealth 
(low) 
519.37 1201.33 820.24 
(965.73) (1697.74) (1360.02) 
{19} {15} {34} 
Total 
1329.00 2153.33 1735.52 
(2304.31) (2941.45) (2651.99) 
{37} {36} {73} 
More 
Sophisticated 
Salient 
(high) 
700.00 859.52 776.14 
(1238.40) (1290.12) (1251.12) 
{23} {21} {44} 
Stealth 
(low) 
1167.39 833.33 996.81 
(1770.70) (1299.39) (1540.20) 
{23} {24} {47} 
Total 
933.70 845.56 890.11 
(1529.20) (1280.35) (1404.50) 
{46} {45} {91} 
Panel B.  ANCOVA: DV =  Revised Investment Amount ($0-$10,000 / open ended)  
Source   df Sum of Squares Mean Square F p-value 
Corrected Model  9 488597119.264a 54288568.807 37.279 0.000 
Error   154 224267208.706 1456280.576   
Corrected Total  163 712864327.970    
        
Source   df 
Type III Sum 
of Squares Mean Square F p-value 
Disaggregated 1 932214.023 932214.023 0.640 0.425 
Salience 1 6344672.706 6344672.706 4.357 0.039 
Disaggregated * Salience 1 733198.747 733198.747 0.503 0.479 
Sophistication 1 815434.870 815434.870 0.560 0.455 
Sophistication * Disaggregated 1 2969962.962 2969962.962 2.039 0.155 
Sophistication * Salience 1 2302800.358 2302800.358 1.581 0.210 
Sophistication * Disaggregated 
* Salience 1 43300.277 43300.277 0.030 0.863 
Baseline investment amount 1 373488435.445 373488435.445 256.467 0.000 
Severity of ICW reported 1 17843046.980 17843046.980 12.252 0.001 
        
a. R Squared = .685 (Adjusted R Squared = .667) 
 Panel C.  Planned contrast tests by Sophistication* 
  t-value 
p-value 
(1-tailed) 
Revised Investment amount at Sophistication = Low (0)  2.581 0.006 
Revised Investment Amount at Sophistication = High (1)  -0.439 0.331 
*Contrast weights: Disaggregated-salient, Disaggregated-stealth, Aggregate-salient, Aggregate-stealth (2,- 2, 1, -1) 
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6.2 Management Trust, Competence, and Credibility 
Management trust, competence, and credibility were collected to provide additional 
support on the effect of presentation salience on nonprofessional investors’ impressions of 
management.  The arguments that led to the directional hypotheses of a positive effect of 
processing fluency in a bad news setting relies on the assumption that report users will have 
positive perceptions of management’s characteristics and management credibility. The 
predictions of an interaction between salience and disaggregation are also heavily reliant on 
report users’ perceptions of management trust and credibility. 
I performed a series of three separate ANCOVA tests to determine whether perceptions 
of management trust, management competence, and management credibility were different 
across the experimental conditions.   The results of the ANCOVA tests are presented in Table 
6.5.  All three models were statistically significant (p<.05).  The interaction between 
disaggregation and salience was significant in the management trustworthiness model (p=.076) 
and the management credibility model (p=.07), and marginally significant in the management 
competence model (p=.109).  I performed a series of two tests for each management 
characteristic variable comparing the means in the salient condition with the means in the stealth 
condition for aggregated and disaggregated conditions separately.  The results of the tests 
disaggregated/salient > disaggregated/stealth were significant in the predicted directions for 
management trustworthiness (p=.072) and management credibility (p=.081), but not significant 
for management competence (p=.122).  The means were not significantly different for the means 
in the aggregated conditions (p<.10).  
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Table 6.5. Additional Tests on Management Characteristics 
Panel A. ANCOVA: DV = Management Trustworthiness (1-Strongly disagree, 7- Strongly agree) 
Source   df 
Sum of 
Squares Mean Square F p-value 
Corrected Model  4 24.852a 6.213 3.147 0.016 
Error   159 313.953 1.975    
Corrected Total  163 338.805     
Source   df 
Type III Sum 
of Squares Mean Square F p-value 
Disaggregated 1 1.137 1.137 0.576 0.449 
Salience 1 0.174 0.174 0.088 0.767 
Disaggregated * Salience 1 6.311 6.311 3.196 0.076 
Severity of ICW reported 1 18.018 18.018 9.125 0.003 
  
Panel B.  ANCOVA: DV = Management Competence (1-Strongly disagree, 7- Strongly agree) 
Source   df 
Sum of 
Squares Mean Square F p-value 
Corrected Model  4 37.456a 9.364 4.734 0.001 
Error   159 314.513 1.978    
Corrected Total  163 351.970     
Source   df 
Type III Sum 
of Squares Mean Square F p-value 
Disaggregated 1 1.953 1.953 0.987 0.322 
Salience 1 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.959 
Disaggregated * Salience 1 5.142 5.142 2.599 0.109 
Severity of ICW reported 1 31.631 31.631 15.991 0.000 
  
Panel C.  ANCOVA: DV =  Management Credibility (AVG of trust and competence) 
Source   df 
Sum of 
Squares Mean Square F p-value 
Corrected Model  4 30.622a 7.656 4.457 0.002 
Error   159 273.126 1.718    
Corrected Total  163 303.748     
        
Source   df 
Type III Sum 
of Squares Mean Square F p-value 
Disaggregated 1 1.517 1.517 0.883 0.349 
Salience 1 0.060 0.060 0.035 0.852 
Disaggregated * Salience 1 5.711 5.711 3.325 0.070 
Severity of ICW reported 1 24.349 24.349 14.175 0.000 
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6.3 The Effect of Salience on Information Acquisition in IC Reports 
Additional analyses was performed to determine whether salience in IC reports improves 
the ability of nonprofessional investors to extract the diagnostic information disclosed.  Croel-
Proell et al. (2014) indicates that presentation salience helps nonprofessional investors to 
incorporate costly information into their judgments.  In the ICW setting, improvement of 
diagnostic information access would mean that IC report users can more easily determine the 
type of MW disclosed, the number of MWs (CDs) disclosed, and the severity of the ICD 
disclosed.   
 
Figure 14.  Performance on ICW type Manipulation Check by Salience 
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Figure 14 depicts the number of participants who passed and failed the manipulation 
check question that related to identifying the type of ICD that was disclosed by salience levels.  I 
investigate the proportion of manipulation failures to this question by collapsing the salient and 
stealth conditions.   This analysis helps determine whether presentation salience helped the 
participants in this study to identify the type of ICW that was disclosed by increasing ICW 
information access in IC reports.  Comparison between low salience and high salience conditions 
are performed using a chi-squared test.  The results indicate that the high presentation salience 
(bulleted) condition has significantly lower proportion of manipulation failure on the ICD 
identification question than the low presentation salience (in-text) condition (χ2=4.02, p<.05).  
Therefore, presentation salience may help nonprofessional investors access the diagnostic 
information in ICW disclosures. 
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7 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION  
7.1 Summary 
Using a controlled behavioral experiment, this dissertation tested whether ICW 
presentation salience and ICW disaggregation differentially affect nonprofessional investor 
perceptions.  The results indicate a dysfunctional effect of presentation salience on investing 
judgments in that it led to increased effects of ease of information access when combined with 
disaggregation of the disclosed information.  This effect of presentation salience on investing 
judgments was amplified when the disclosed information was in an unpacked form.  Specifically, 
when a material weakness that arises from a combination of control deficiencies is presented in a 
bulleted format, it was perceived more positively for investing judgments than when the same 
information was disclosed in an in-text format.  A summary of the results of the tests of 
hypotheses is presented in Table 7.1. 
Table 7.1. Summary of the Results of the Hypotheses Tests 
Dependent Variable 
Test of H1 Test of H3 
Salience   ↓ Risk of 
Misstatement 
Salience x Disaggregation      
Risk of Misstatement 
Risk of Misstatement 
Supported  Not Supported  
(ANCOVA) (ANCOVA and Planned contrast) 
Dependent Variable 
Test of H2 Test of H4 
Salience   ↑ Investing 
Judgments 
Salience x Disaggregation      
Investing Judgments 
Impression of investment 
Supported  Supported  
(ANCOVA) (Planned contrast) 
Likelihood of price 
decline/increase 
Not Supported  Supported 
(ANCOVA) (ANCOVA and Planned contrast) 
Investment amount 
Supported  Supported  
(ANCOVA) (Planned contrast) 
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This effect of salience on investing judgments was predicted and found to be more severe 
for nonprofessional investors when displayed in a disaggregated format.  Nonprofessional 
investors likely overweight an ICW that is in a disaggregated format because presentation of 
such material requires cognitive effort to combine heuristic cues and has lower processing 
fluency.  Thus, in this experiment processing fluency was decreased by disaggregation. The 
second manipulation also affected processing fluency; decreasing it in a stealth (in-text) 
presentation format and increasing it in the bulleted (salient) presentation format.  Additionally, 
as predicted, an ICW that arises from a combination of control deficiencies was attributed to 
higher management competence and trust when it is disclosed saliently than when it is disclosed 
in a stealth manner.   
Similar directional hypotheses were posited regarding the effect of salience and 
disaggregation on nonprofessional investors’ assessments of misstatement risk.  The results 
indicated that salience was associated with lower assessments of risk of misstatement.  
Interestingly, the planned contrast tests and additional results indicated that nonprofessional 
investors expected “material” weaknesses to be displayed in a salient format and rewarded 
management that disclosed the aggregated ICW saliently.  The result indicates that the task of 
analyzing risk of misstatement leads nonprofessional investors to form expectations of the 
material weakness to be saliently disclosed only when that disclosure is of the aggregated type 
(MW).  The result was consistent with predictions of attribution theory. 
7.2 Contribution 
The dissertation shows that increased ease of access to information and disaggregation 
may not always be as desirable as the SEC and the FASB’s financial statement presentation 
framework advocates.  Although the information contained in the ICW disclosure is expected to 
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be negative, increased ease of access to such negative information appears to mitigate the 
negative response to ICW disclosures.  This positive effect of presentation salience to negative 
information disclosure may not be desirable since it results purely from the presentation of the 
information.   
The findings of this study contribute to the literature on ICW disclosures, nonprofessional 
investor behavior, and presentation formats of nonfinancial information disclosures.  Academics 
who currently study the effects of ICW disclosures on investing and risk of material 
misstatement do not control for either ICW disaggregation or ICW presentation salience.  The 
results provide support for the inclusion of these variables and opens avenues to future archival 
research that replicates studies in the ICW literature.  The stream of literature on presentation 
formats of corporate nonfinancial information is also informed regarding the positive effect of 
presentation salience in a bad news setting of the disclosure of internal control weaknesses.  
Specifically, presentation salience of bad news leads to a more positive interpretation of the 
information cue regardless of the valence of the information.  This result is contrary to the 
findings of Rennekamp (2012), which is related to the investing effects of processing fluency on 
earnings announcements (negative effect for bad news and positive for good news). 
The study also contributes to practice since the different ICW formats that are tested in 
this dissertation are present in the 10-K reports that are currently being filed with the SEC.   
Management currently using one of the ICW formats to prepare ICW disclosures can be made 
aware of the unintended consequences of the format used to prepare the ICW disclosure section 
on nonprofessional investor behavior.  Management may want to use a salient presentation 
format particularly when it has material weaknesses that arise from a combination of control 
deficiencies.  The findings indicate that nonprofessional investors respond significantly less 
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negatively in their investing judgments and perceived management as more credible when a 
material weakness that arises from a combination of control deficiencies is disclosed using a 
salient (bulleted) format than when it is disclosed using a stealth (in-text) format.   
The findings also have implications to the design used for the auditor’s standard report 
and some of the proposed changes to the level of detail that need to be included by the auditor.  
Specifically, the format and structure of the presentation of detailed significant audit findings and 
disaggregation of audit procedures may lead investors to weight that information differently. 
Standard setters may need to consider a stylistic standard to avoid unintended differences in 
weighting information that is contained in an update that expands the standard audit report. 
7.3 Limitations 
The study has several limitations that are acknowledged here.  First, the 
operationalization of disaggregation assumes that a material weakness is equivalent to the three 
control deficiencies.  To alleviate this concern, the multiple control deficiencies that were 
disclosed in the disaggregate setting were also briefly included in the description of the material 
weakness.  Additionally, the results observed for the specific type of material weakness may not 
hold true for other types of material weaknesses.  Second, due to the methods used by the panel 
survey service and participants’ limited attention, a high rate of manipulation failure in this study 
was observed.  The high failure rate indicates that some participants may not even read the entire 
internal control report as documented in Arnold et al. (2011).  The findings of this dissertation 
are therefore limited to the group of nonprofessional investors that are not fatigued by some of 
the longer IC reports that may have a higher non-diagnostic information to diagnostic 
information ratio.  Third, the use of a survey panel combined with an online instrument 
sacrificed some experimental control that would have otherwise been available in a laboratory 
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setting.  Participants may therefore have been distracted, interrupted, or performed other tasks 
while completing the study.  
7.4 Future Research 
Professional and nonprofessional investors have differences in their approaches to 
information access, information processing, and information evaluation (Elliott 2006; Maines 
and McDaniel 2000; Anderson 1988; Frederickson and Miller 2004).  Professional investors use 
a directed search strategy and have mental models of the cues that help identify firm 
performance (Frederickson and Miller 2004; Bouwman et al. 1987).  Unlike professional 
investors, nonprofessional investors use a sequential search strategy to access information, rely 
on the use of heuristics, and have ill-defined valuation models (Maines and McDaniel 2000).   
Studies comparing the performance of professional and nonprofessional investors 
indicate that professional investors are better able to extract information such as ICW 
information from annual reports, use valuation models instead of simple heuristics, are better 
able to recognize the relation between different sections of a financial report, and are less 
influenced by unaudited information (Elliott 2006; Arnold et al. 2011; Maines and McDaniel 
2000; Frederickson and Miller 2004; Hirst and Hopkins 1998; Dilla et al. 2012).  However, 
professional investors are also susceptible to location effects of information (Hirst and Hopkins 
1998; Dilla et al. 2012). 
Nonprofessional and professional investors are likely to process ICW information 
differently because, unlike professionals, nonprofessional investors access information 
sequentially and have ill-defined valuation models (Maines and McDaniel 2000).  However, 
while professional investors are able to access information in a directed manner and possess 
better defined mental valuation models, they have been documented to be susceptible to 
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formatting effects (Hirst and Hopkins 1998).  Therefore, it is unclear how these investor groups 
will differ in their reaction to alternative ICW presentation formats.  Future research can 
investigate whether the favorable effects of ICW presentation salience and the interaction 
documented in this study will hold for the professional investor group. 
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Appendix A:  Experimental Instrument 
SCREENING QUESTIONS 
 
 
 
Have you bought or sold individual stocks (not including mutual funds) within the past 2 years? 
 
 
 
Yes No 
 
  
 
Have you bought or sold stocks or other securities as part of your profession (e.g. broker, analyst, financial 
advisor etc.)? 
 
 
 
Yes No 
  
 
What type of device are you using to complete this survey? 
 
 
 
  Laptop / Desktop     Tablet      Mobile device / Smartphone 
 
INSTRUCTIONS 
 
Thank you for your participation in this research study. The purpose of this study is to obtain information 
about how investors make judgments and decisions. You will be asked to assume the role of an investor 
throughout the study. You will read information regarding a publicly traded company and respond to 
questions as a potential investor in this company. The information provided is intended to be representative 
rather than complete. Please be sure to base your opinions and perceptions only on the information provided 
in this case. There are no right or wrong answers. Carefully read all information provided before 
responding to the questions. Please refrain from pressing the “BACK” button as you are not allowed to go 
back to a previous screen. 
 
Please note that you are only allowed to take this study once without any interruption.   Your participation in 
the study is completely voluntary.  You may discontinue participation in this study at any time.  Your 
responses are confidential and no identifying information will be used. 
 
The person in charge of this research study is Amanuel Tadesse, the Principal Investigator. However, other 
research staff may be involved and can act on behalf of the person in charge. This research is considered 
minimal risk. The risks from participating in this   study are not more than would be encountered in 
everyday life. Your participation in this study will help advance the body of knowledge regarding investors' 
judgments. Please do NOT discuss the study with your friends, co-workers, or others who may also 
participate in this study since doing so may invalidate the results of this research. 
 
This study, titled “Disclosures and Investing Decisions,” is an approved IRB study #Pro00018003. If you 
have any questions or concerns about this study, please contact Amanuel Tadesse at 813-974-7721. If you 
have questions about your rights as a participant in this study, general questions, or have complaints, 
concerns or issues you want to discuss with someone outside the research staff, call the Division of 
Research Integrity and Compliance at the University of South Florida at 813-974-5638. 
 
Please check the box below if you agree to participate in this study. 
 
 
 
  I agree to participate in this study 
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TASK DESCRIPTION 
 
You are asked to assume the role of a potential investor throughout the study. You will receive information 
about a small publicly traded company, ANZ Technologies. You will read and evaluate company information 
such as the financial statements, management's report on internal controls, and key ratio statistics for this 
company. Based on the information provided in the case, you will be asked to provide your perceptions and 
investing judgments regarding the company. 
 
COMPANY INFORMATION 
 
ANZ Technologies Corp (NYSE MKT: ANZT) provides electronic contract manufacturing services to 
advanced technology companies in the United States. It specializes in the custom manufacture of complex 
circuit cards and system-level assemblies for use in various products, such as military and aerospace systems, 
medical devices, industrial equipment, and transportation products. It is also involved in the testing and 
detection of counterfeit electronic parts, as well as component risk mitigation and advanced failure analysis. 
 
INDUSTRY 
 
The electronic semiconductor equipment market is very competitive and market demand is very volatile. 
Although last year saw contractions in this market, global revenues are expected to grow 4-6% over the next 
year. 
 
INTERNAL CONTROLS 
 
Management is required by law to assess internal controls in the organization and annually report on the 
effectiveness of the controls over financial reporting. Internal controls are expected to provide reasonable 
assurance that an organization's financial statements are free of material misstatements. 
 
MATERIAL WEAKNESSES 
 
A material weakness is a control deficiency, or a combination of control deficiencies, in internal control over 
financial reporting such that there is a reasonable possibility that a material misstatement of the annual or 
interim financial statements will not be prevented or detected on a timely basis. 
 
As defined above, a material weakness can either be: 
 
• one control deficiency that is severe enough to pose the risk of material misstatement in the financial 
statements, or 
• a combination of multiple control deficiencies that are not severe individually but when considered in 
aggregate pose the risk of material misstatement in the financial statements 
 
Please note that control deficiencies are normally considered the least severe form of deficiencies in internal 
control and are not required to be disclosed to the public unless they rise to the severity level of a material 
weakness. 
 
 
In the following page, please examine ANZ's provided information and respond to the questions provided. 
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ANZ Technologies Corporation Annual Report Form 10-K filing 
 
Part II, Item 8, Financial Statements and Supplementary Data 
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Please assume that this information was disclosed to the public today. 
 
 
 
1. What is your overall impression of ANZ as an investment? 
 
 
Very 
Unfavorable 
      
Very 
Favorable 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
2. Assume that you recently inherited $10,000 from a distant relative and you wanted to invest 
it in stocks; how much of $10,000 would you invest in ANZ's stock? 
 
Please enter your investment (0 - 10,000): 
 
 
 
 
 
3. What is the likelihood of a moderate stock price change (1-10%) in ANZ's stock within the next year? 
 
  
 Highest             Highest  likelihood             likelihood 
of decline       No      of increase 
-7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 change 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7 
 
 
  
 
107 
 
MANIPULATIONS – Disaggregated Conditions 
(Please note that this page is not displayed on the actual survey instrument) 
  
1. Disaggregated (multiple control deficiencies) – Salient (bulleted) 
 
A material weakness is a control deficiency, or combination of control deficiencies, that results in 
more than a remote likelihood that a material misstatement of the annual or interim financial statements will 
not be prevented or detected. Management identified three control deficiencies which, in the aggregate, 
constitute a material weakness in the Company’s internal control over financial reporting as of September 30, 
2014. The control deficiencies include: 
 
• ineffective controls to ensure the timely issuance of invoice adjustments 
• ineffective controls over the initiation of customer master records and contracts to ensure consistent 
billing of periodic charges  
• incompatible duties were not segregated within the billing function 
 
Although these control deficiencies are not material individually, in aggregate, their combination 
could result in a material misstatement of sales and accounts receivable in the Company’s interim or annual 
consolidated financial statements that would not be prevented or detected in a timely manner. Therefore, 
management has concluded that the Company did not maintain effective internal control over financial 
reporting as of September 30, 2014. 
 
 
 
2. Disaggregated (multiple control deficiencies) – Stealth (in-text) 
 
A material weakness is a control deficiency, or combination of control deficiencies, that results in 
more than a remote likelihood that a material misstatement of the annual or interim financial statements will 
not be prevented or detected. Management identified three control deficiencies which, in the aggregate, 
constitute a material weakness in the Company’s internal control over financial reporting as of September 30, 
2014. Specifically, the control deficiencies include ineffective controls to ensure the timely issuance of invoice 
adjustments, ineffective controls over the initiation of customer master records and contracts to ensure 
consistent billing of periodic charges, and incompatible duties that were not segregated within the billing 
function. 
 
Although these control deficiencies are not material individually, in aggregate, their combination 
could result in a material misstatement of sales and accounts receivable in the Company’s interim or annual 
consolidated financial statements that would not be prevented or detected in a timely manner. Therefore, 
management concluded that the Company did not maintain effective internal control over financial reporting 
as of September 30, 2014. 
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MANIPULATIONS – Aggregated Conditions 
(Please note that this page is not displayed on the actual survey instrument) 
  
3. Aggregated (single material weakness) – Salient (bulleted) 
 
A material weakness is a control deficiency, or combination of control deficiencies, that results in 
more than a remote likelihood that a material misstatement of the annual or interim financial statements will 
not be prevented or detected. Management identified one material weakness in the Company’s internal control 
over financial reporting as of September 30, 2014. The material weakness is: 
 
• The Company did not maintain effective segregation and controls over billing and invoice adjustment 
processes to ensure accuracy and validity of receivables. 
 
This material weakness could result in a material misstatement of sales and accounts receivable in the 
Company’s interim or annual consolidated financial statements that would not be prevented or detected in a 
timely manner. Therefore, management has concluded that the Company did not maintain effective internal 
control over financial reporting as of September 30, 2014. 
 
 
4. Aggregated (single material weakness) – Stealth (in-text) 
 
A material weakness is a control deficiency, or combination of control deficiencies, that results in 
more than a remote likelihood that a material misstatement of the annual or interim financial statements will 
not be prevented or detected. Management identified one material weakness in the Company’s internal control 
over financial reporting as of September 30, 2014. Specifically, the material weakness is that the Company did 
not maintain effective segregation and controls over billing and invoice adjustment processes to ensure 
accuracy and validity of receivables. 
 
This material weakness could result in a material misstatement of sales and accounts receivable in the 
Company’s interim or annual consolidated financial statements that would not be prevented or detected in a 
timely manner. Therefore, management has concluded that the Company did not maintain effective internal 
control over financial reporting as of September 30, 2014.  
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EXAMPLE – Disaggregated – Salient Condition 
(Please note that this title is not displayed on the actual survey instrument) 
 
 
 
Part II, Item 9A, Controls and Procedures; 
 
 
 
 
Management’s Report on Internal Control over Financial Reporting 
 
Management is responsible for establishing and maintaining adequate internal control over financial 
reporting, as such term is defined in Exchange Act Rule 13a-15(f). The Company’s internal control over 
financial reporting is a process designed to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial 
reporting and the preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with generally 
accepted accounting principles in the United States of America. Because of its inherent limitations, internal 
control over financial reporting may not prevent or detect misstatements. 
 
Our management, with the participation of our Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer, 
has evaluated the effectiveness of the Company’s internal control over financial reporting using the criteria 
described in Internal Control — Integrated Framework issued by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations 
of the Treadway Commission (“COSO”). 
 
A material weakness is a control deficiency, or combination of control deficiencies, that results in 
more than a remote likelihood that a material misstatement of the annual or interim financial statements will 
not be prevented or detected. Management identified three control deficiencies which, in the aggregate, 
constitute a material weakness in the Company’s internal control over financial reporting as of September 30, 
2014. The control deficiencies include: 
 
• ineffective controls to ensure the timely issuance of invoice adjustments 
• ineffective controls over the initiation of customer master records and contracts to ensure consistent 
billing of periodic charges  
• incompatible duties were not segregated within the billing function 
 
Although these control deficiencies are not material individually, in aggregate, their combination 
could result in a material misstatement of sales and accounts receivable in the Company’s interim or annual 
consolidated financial statements that would not be prevented or detected in a timely manner. Therefore, 
management has concluded that the Company did not maintain effective internal control over financial 
reporting as of September 30, 2014. 
 
This annual report does not include an attestation report of our registered public accounting firm 
regarding internal control over financial reporting. Management’s report was not subject to attestation by our 
registered public accounting firm pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act, which permits us to provide only management’s report in this annual report. 
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Please assume that this information was disclosed to the public today. 
 
 
 
1. Considering the above internal control disclosure, what is your overall impression of ANZ as 
an investment? Recall that your impression of the investment prior to viewing this disclosure 
was "[## from baseline assessment]"? 
 
Very 
Unfavorable 
      
Very 
Favorable 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
 
2. Assume that you recently inherited $10,000 from a distant relative and you wanted to invest it 
in stocks; how much of $10,000 would you invest in ANZ's stock? Recall that you were 
willing to invest "[## from baseline assessment]" in ANZ's stock prior to viewing this 
disclosure. 
 
Please enter your investment (0 - 10,000): 
 
 
 
 
3. What is the likelihood of a moderate stock price change (1-10%) in ANZ's stock within 
the next year?  Recall that your assessment prior to viewing this disclosure was [## from 
baseline assessment]." 
  
 Highest             Highest  likelihood             likelihood 
of decline       No      of increase 
-7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 change 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 +5 +6 +7 
 
 
4. What is the risk that ANZ's financial statements contain a material misstatement? 
No chance  
of 
 
         Highly 
likely 
a material          a material 
misstatement          misstatement 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
           
 
5. Please indicate the reasoning behind your revised assessments. 
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MANIPULATION CHECK QUESTIONS  
(Please note that this title is not displayed to participants) 
 
1. What was (were) the type of internal control issue(s) indicated in management’s report on internal control 
over financial reporting? 
 
 Three control deficiencies that are not material individually, but in aggregate, their combination 
could result in a material misstatement 
 One material weakness that could result in a material misstatement 
 
2. What was (were) the type of internal control issue(s) indicated in management’s report on internal control 
over financial reporting? 
 
Identified with bullet point(s) Not identified with bullet point(s) 
 
 
  
 
3. The specific section discussing the internal control issue(s) disclosed in management's internal control 
report was clearly presented and it was easy to understand whether a control issue or issues existed. 
 
Strongly 
Disagree 
     Strongly 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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Recall that management identified the following control deficiencies that in aggregate constituted a material 
weakness [Replace the underlined text with “a material weakness” in aggregated conditions and the 
identified material weakness below – bolded writing not shown to participant]  in internal control over 
financial reporting 
 
• Ineffective controls to ensure the timely issuance of invoice adjustments 
• Ineffective controls over the initiation of customer master records and contracts to ensure 
consistent billing of periodic charges  
• Incompatible duties were not segregated within the billing function 
 
 
1.  Please rate your perceptions of the severity of the combination of issues in internal control (in 
aggregate).  [Replace the underlined text with “the issue in internal control” in aggregated conditions – 
bolded writing not shown to participant] 
 
Very low 
severity  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Very high 
severity  
7 
Combined severity of the 
identified control deficiencies               
 
 
2.  What is the likelihood that the combination of the issues in internal control (in aggregate) will cause 
the financial statements to contain material errors? [Replace the underlined text with “the issue in internal 
control” in aggregated conditions – bolded writing not shown to participant] 
 
0% - 
No 
chance 
10% 20% 30% 40% 
50% - 
Coin flip 
or 50-50 
chance 
to cause 
material 
errors 
60% 70% 80% 90% 
100% - 
Certain 
to cause 
material 
errors 
Combined 
effect of the 
identified 
control 
deficiencies 
                      
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QUESTIONS ON THESE PAGE WERE ONLY ASKED IN DISAGGREGATED 
CONDITIONS  
(Please note that this title is not displayed to participants) 
 
 
1.  Please rate your perceptions of the severity of each of ANZ’s identified issues in internal control. 
 1 - Very low severity 2 3 4 5 6 
7 - Very 
high 
severity 
 Ineffective controls to ensure the timely 
issuance of invoice adjustments.               
 Ineffective controls over the initiation of 
customer master records and contracts to 
ensure consistent billing of periodic 
charges 
              
 Incompatible duties were not 
segregated within the billing function               
 
 
2.  Please rate your assessments of the likelihood that each of ANZ's issues in internal control will cause the 
financial statements to contain material errors. 
 
0% - 
No 
chance 
10% 20% 30% 40% 
50% - Coin 
flip or 50-
50 chance 
to cause a 
material 
error 
60% 70% 80% 90% 
100% - 
Certain to 
cause a 
material 
error 
 Ineffective controls 
to ensure the timely 
issuance of invoice 
adjustments 
                      
 Ineffective controls 
over the initiation of 
customer master 
records and contracts 
to ensure consistent 
billing of periodic 
charges 
                      
 Incompatible duties 
were not 
segregated within the 
billing function 
                      
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QUESTIONS ON PERCEPTIONS OF MANAGEMENT 
(Please note that this title is not displayed to participants) 
 
 
1.  To what extent do you think you can rely on ANZ’s internal control report? 
 
 
Not at all  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Completely  
 7   
              
 
2. I think that management is competent to prepare and communicate company disclosures to the 
public. 
 
Strongly 
disagree  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Strongly 
agree  
 7   
              
 
 
3. I think that management is trustworthy in preparing and communicating company disclosures to the 
public. 
 
Strongly 
disagree  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Strongly 
agree  
 7   
              
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
QUESTIONS FROM VAN ROOIJ ET AL. (2011) WERE USED TO MEASURE RISK 
PREFERENECES AND FINANCIAL LITERACY (NOT DISPLAYED HERE) 
(Please note that this title is not displayed to participants) 
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POST-EXPERIMENTAL QUESTIONNAIRE 
(Please note that this title is not displayed to participants) 
 
Please respond to these final set of questions - Your responses are highly valued, Thanks! 
 
 
Did management indicate that the internal control over financial reporting was not effective? 
Yes, the company’s internal control 
was not effective 
No, the company’s internal 
control was effective I do not know   
      
 
How does the presence of internal control weaknesses affect a company's financial reporting system? 
Negative 
effect  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Positive 
effect  
 7   
              
 
How would you rate your understanding of internal controls? 
Low level of 
understanding  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
High level of 
understanding  
 7   
              
 
All else equal, to what extent would your investing decisions be affected by the internal control 
disclosures on the effectiveness of internal controls over financial reporting? 
No, Internal control 
disclosures do not affect 
my investing decisions  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Yes, Internal control 
disclosures affect my 
investing decisions  
 7   
              
 
All else equal, how severe do you consider control deficiencies to be relative to material weaknesses 
Control deficiencies are 
much more severe than 
Material weaknesses 
1 2 3 
Control deficiencies 
and Material 
weaknesses are of 
equal severity  
4 5 6 
Material weaknesses are 
much more severe than 
Control deficiencies  
 7   
              
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How would you rate your familiarity with an annual report of a publically listed corporation (10-K)? 
Not 
familiar  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Very 
familiar  
 7   
              
 
Would you please select “6” for this question? 
Not 
familiar  
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Very 
familiar  
 7   
              
 
Please indicate the frequency with which you read the following sections of a company’s annual report 
 Never read Sometimes read Often read Always read 
Management 
Discussion and 
Analysis 
        
Auditor's Report         
Notes to the 
financial 
statements 
        
 
Did you make your investment decisions for a long-term investment or a short-term profit? 
Short-term 
investment 
horizon  
1    Neutral    
Very 
familiar  
 7   
                  
 
How many months has it been since you last actively sold or bought individual stocks in the stock 
market? (Put 0 if you haven’t actively invested in stocks and 1 if you have sold or bought stocks in the 
past month)  
 
 
  
 
117 
 
Approximately how many times do you trade (buy or sell individual stocks) in a year?  
 0 - 10 trades per year 
 10 - 100 trades per year 
 100 - 1,000 trades per year 
 Over 1,000 trades per year 
 
To what extent do you use an intermediary financial adviser / investment broker / financial planner to 
manage your investments? 
I manage 
all my 
investments 
on my own 
1        
I let my 
financial 
adviser / 
planner 
handle all 
my 
investments  
 7   
                  
 
How many years has it been since you started buying or selling individual stocks on your own? (Put 0 if 
you have never actively invested in stocks and 1 if you have less than a year's worth of investing 
experience) 
 
 
 
 
DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION 
 
What is your age?  
 
 
 
 
Please indicate your gender. 
    Male      Female 
 
What is the highest degree or level of schooling you have completed? 
 
 No schooling completed 
 Some college credits, less than two years of full time coursework 
 Associate degree, or over two years of full time coursework 
 Bachelor’s degree 
 Master’s degree 
 Doctorate degree 
 
 
 
 
 
 
118 
 
Do you have a business degree? 
   Yes       No 
 
How many accounting courses you have you taken? (Enter 0 for none) 
 
 
 
 
How many finance courses have you taken? (Enter 0 for none) 
 
 
 
 
How many years of professional work experience do you have? (Put 0 if you have no professional work 
experience and 1 if you have less than a year's worth of professional work experience) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thank you for participating in this survey.  Please click next to save your responses. 
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Appendix B:  IRB Approval Letter 
 
120 
 
 
